

Please cite the published version in *Synthese*, available at Springer via <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1113-1>

Looking Angry and Sounding Sad: The Perceptual Analysis of Emotional Expression

Trip Glazer

“We see emotion.” – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. (Wittgenstein 1980, §570)

A satisfying analysis of “emotional expression” ought to specify the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions under which a bit of behavior will count as an expression of emotion. This analysis ought to tell us why a smile is an expression of joy, a pout is an expression of grief, and a growl is an expression of anger. Furthermore, it ought to tell us why other behaviors, like coughing and wheezing, aren’t (typically) expressions of emotion at all.

According to the analysis that I defend here, the *Perceptual Analysis of Emotional Expression*, behaviors express emotions by making them perceptually manifest. A smile is an expression of joy because an observer who sees a smile can see joy. A pout is an expression of grief because an observer who sees a pout can see grief. And a growl is an expression of anger because an observer who hears a growl can hear anger. To the extent that neither coughing nor wheezing enables the perception of emotion, neither is an expression of emotion either.¹ On this view, the enabling of the perception

¹ As we shall see in §3.2, however, it is possible for coughing and wheezing to be expressions of emotion, but, in those cases, they will also enable the perception of emotion.

of emotion is both necessary and sufficient for the expression of emotion. Any behavior that enables the perception of emotion will count as an emotional expression, just as any behavior that doesn't won't.

I am by no means the first to suggest that expressions make emotions perceptually manifest. Indeed, many other philosophers have argued just that.² But we should distinguish the claim that emotional expressions *can* at times make emotions perceptually manifest from the claim that emotional expressions *essentially* do so. The former is a modal claim about our perceptual capacities; the latter a conceptual claim about the nature of expression. Although the conceptual claim can presumably be true only if the modal claim is also true, it is possible for the modal claim to be true and the conceptual claim false—if, for instance, some emotional expressions enable the perception of emotion while others do not.³ Sure enough, most recent work on the perceptibility of emotion has focused on substantiating the modal claim while either denying or remaining agnostic on the conceptual claim (e.g. Zahavi 2007; Green 2010a; Gallagher & Zahavi 2012; Smith 2015). I buck this trend by intentionally pursuing the stronger conceptual claim.⁴ On my view, emotional expressions don't just happen to enable the

² Classic formulations include Scheler (1970, 256; for commentary, see Gallagher & Zahavi [2012, 201-204]), Wittgenstein (1980, §570; for commentary, see Overgaard [2006]), and Taylor (1979, 73-74; for commentary, see Campbell [1997, 59-63]). Recent formulations include Green (2007, 84-93; 2010a), Bar-On (2004, 264-284; 2010), Zahavi (2007), Smith (2015), and Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel (2015).

³ Mitchell Green (2007) defends this view. In his analysis of “self-expression,” which includes only those behaviors that signal and show an agent’s own occurrent mental state, Green argues that the enabling of perception is but one of three ways of showing. We can also show *that* we have an emotion by providing evidence of it, and show *how* an emotion feels by helping others to empathize with us. Green contends that agents can express their mental states via these other means of showing as well (2007, 25, 212). Thus while Green agrees that emotional expressions *can* and sometimes do enable the perception of an agent’s occurrent emotions, he denies that all do so, and thus he denies that the enabling of perception is essential to self-expression (and, *a fortiori*, to expression more generally).

⁴ Charles Taylor is perhaps the only other philosopher to defend the perceptual claim specifically as a conceptual claim (1979, 73-74). My version of the Perceptual Analysis differs from Taylor’s in several important respects, and answers objections that his version cannot. Dorit Bar-On (2004; 2010) defends a version of the Perceptual Analysis with respect to “natural expressions” of emotion, but not with respect to the expression of emotion more generally. See note 10, below, for my take on Bar-On’s view.

perception of emotion; rather, the enabling of perception is precisely what makes a behavior count as an emotional expression in the first place.

This is a bold thesis, which has far-reaching implications. One implication, which many are bound to find troubling, is that emotional expressions turn out to be fundamentally non-linguistic—that *language* is not a means of emotional expression, since language does not, per se, enable the perception of emotion. I agree that the Perceptual Analysis commits us this conclusion, but, far from being troubled by it, I argue that this is precisely the right conclusion to draw. Although we can and often do express our emotions in speech (e.g. by saying “I am pissed off!”), it is always *how* we say something, and never *what* we say, that makes a speech act an expression of emotion.⁵ Language is used, I suggest, not to express our emotions directly, but to communicate them in other ways. The Perceptual Analysis challenges us to rethink the complex relationship between language and expression, but inspires an elegant and fruitful account of the interfacing of linguistic and non-linguistic communication.

The paper is structured as follows: §1 develops the Perceptual Analysis in greater detail; §2 offers an argument on its behalf; and §3 defends it against objections.

1. The Perceptual Analysis of Emotional Expression

The Perceptual Analysis defines emotional expressions as all and only those behaviors that enable the perception of emotion. To clarify this thesis, I shall distinguish between two kinds of perception (§1.1), explain what I mean by “enabling” the perception of emotion (§1.2), and then apply these concepts to three kinds of emotional expression (§1.3).

⁵ In note 27, below, I respond to what seems like an obvious objection to this claim, namely the possibility of expressing our emotions in writing.

1.1. Two Kinds of Perception

Philosophers often distinguish between two kinds of perception: *perceiving* and *perceiving-as* (Hanson 1958; Wittgenstein 2006; Dretske 1969). Although two people may see the same duck-rabbit drawing in a book, one may see it as a duck and the other may see it as a rabbit. In what follows, I shall assume two differences between perceiving and perceiving-as.

First, perceiving is a success term, which means that a person can perceive something only if what she perceives is truly there, whereas perceiving-as is not (Smith 2015; Searle 2015). Thus, a desert traveler who happens upon an oasis can see that oasis, while a desert traveler who happens upon a mirage cannot, since there isn't an oasis there for her to see. The second traveler may nonetheless see the mirage as an oasis, where her illusory perceptual experience may be indistinguishable from the veridical perceptual experience of the first traveler.

Second, perceiving does not imply conscious awareness of what one has seen, whereas perceiving-as does (Dretske 2006; Smith 2015). Were you to mistake my painted mule Bucky for a zebra, then you would be unaware of having seen a mule but aware of having seen it as a zebra. It is often said that perceiving-as requires concepts and interpretation whereas perceiving does not (Hanson 1958; Wittgenstein 2006; but see Orlandi 2011 and Smith 2015 for non-conceptual accounts of perceiving-as). Both Bucky and I can see the Monet painting in the museum, but only I can see it as a Monet, because only I have a Monet concept. Illusions exploit our tendency to interpret what we perceive, thereby opening a rift between what we perceive and what we perceive it as. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, for instance, we see two lines of the same length, but we see them as two lines of different lengths.

Often, we perceive in both ways at the same time. I see the Monet, and I see it as a Monet. At other times, we perceive in only one way. I might confuse a Manet for a Monet, in which case I've seen something as a Monet without having seen a Monet. Or I might run my eyes over a Monet without recognizing it, in which case I've seen a Monet without having seen it as a Monet. As we shall see, both kinds of perception are important for expression.

1.2. Enabling Perception

According to the Perceptual Analysis, a behavior expresses an emotion just in case it enables the perception of that emotion. I've distinguished between two kinds of perception, but I've yet to explain what it means to *enable* perception. On my view, a behavior B enables the perception of an emotion E just in case observers can perceive E (or perceive B as E) as a result of perceiving B, without needing to perceive any other behaviors in between. Two comments are in order.

First, this formulation allows for B to enable the perception of E even if observers do not in fact perceive B. My solitary smile enables the perception of—and therefore expresses—my joy, even if no one else is around to see it. The claim is counterfactual: *were* someone to see my smile, *then* she would be able to see my joy (or to see me as joyous).

Second, the qualification, “without needing to perceive any other behaviors in between,” is added to prevent the analysis from being too permissive (cf. Bar-On 2004, 275). In the ordinary sense of “enable,” I can enable an observer to see John’s anger by pointing to John’s scowl. Yet, intuitively, I haven’t thereby expressed John’s emotion; only John’s scowl has expressed it. The problem is that “enabling” is a transitive relation, and thus any behavior that enables the perception of an emotional *expression* will also enable the perception of the *emotion* expressed. With the above qualification, however, “enabling” becomes a nontransitive relation. (We could call this stricter notion of enabling “direct enabling.”) Pointing to John’s scowl would not count as an expression of John’s anger, then, because observers who perceive the pointing must also perceive John’s scowl in order to perceive his anger. The only behavior that directly enables the perception of John’s anger—and, indeed, the only behavior that expresses it—is his scowl.⁶ (In what follows, I will use “enabling” to mean “directly enabling.”)

⁶ Is it ever possible for one person to express another person’s emotions? I am tempted to say yes, as long as the first person “embodies” the second person, e.g. in a theatrical or musical performance. The actor who breaks down crying on stage during a production of *Antigone* isn’t expressing *his* grief; he’s expressing *Creon’s* grief, which he does by expressing grief while embodying Creon. Similarly, the violinist who plays a moving sonata may not be expressing *her* sadness, but rather the composer’s, whose subjectivity is embodied in the performance.

1.3. Three Kinds of Emotional Expression

According to the version of the Perceptual Analysis defended here, a behavior expresses an emotion just in case it enables at least one kind of perception of emotion, and fails to express an emotion just in case it enables neither kind of perception of emotion. Let us now distinguish between three kinds of emotional expression, and see what the Perceptual Analysis says about each.

Natural expressions occur spontaneously as part of an emotional episode, and take a species-typical form, which is to say that they correspond to how members of the species usually express an emotion. For humans, smiles are natural expressions of joy, pouts are natural expressions of grief, and scowls are natural expressions of anger (Ekman & Friesen 2003). Natural expressions normally enable both kinds of perception at once. When a person feels happy and smiles, observers who see this smile can both see the person's joy and see her as joyful. Sometimes, however, an observer will fail to perceive the person as joyful. Perhaps this observer suffers from a rare disorder that prevents her from being able to recognize natural expressions of emotion, and so prevents her from perceiving the smile as joyful. In any case, the observer who perceives the smile will have perceived the expresser's joy in her smile, where this perception is sufficient to make the smile an expression of emotion. (Here I am merely stating the view; I shall defend it starting in §3.1, below.)

Idiosyncratic expressions also occur spontaneously as part of an emotional episode, but take an individual-atypical form, which is to say that they depart from how an individual usually expresses an emotion. A person might idiosyncratically express joy by wincing, grief by smiling, or anger by shuddering. Granting that such expressions are truly anomalous, they enable perception, but not perception-as. Should a person wince upon feeling happy, for instance, then an observer who sees this wince would see the person's joy without seeing her as joyful.

Natural and idiosyncratic expressions are not discrete categories, but instead occupy two extremes on a spectrum of spontaneous expressions. In the middle of the spectrum we find individual-typical expressions, or expressions that are characteristic to particular individuals but not to the species (see Green 2007, 140-141; Green 2010a, 51). Should a person wince whenever she feels happy, and should her friends know this about her, then

her friends may be able to see her as joyful while strangers may not. Thus, I claim that while all expressions on this spectrum enable perception, only some of them enable perception-as. The more typical an expression is, the more likely it is that observers will be able to perceive the behavior as angry, sad, happy, etc.

Voluntary expressions, finally, tend to be typical (in either sense), but do not occur spontaneously as part of an emotional episode.⁷ Such expressions may be sincere or non-sincere.⁸ A person may not smile spontaneously when feeling happy, yet smile voluntarily for the sake of communicating her happiness to others. Or a person may not feel happy at all, yet smile voluntarily for the sake of deceiving others. Voluntary expressions enable only perception-as. An observer who sees a voluntary smile may see the person as joyful without in fact seeing her joy. (Many philosophers deny that non-sincere expressions ought to be counted as true “expressions.”⁹ Some say that non-sincere expressions are “expressive” of emotion but not literally “expressions” of emotion. I believe that these philosophers are mistaken, and I shall return to this point in §3.3, below.)

We have, then, three kinds of emotional expression, and the Perceptual Analysis employs both kinds of perception in order to explain how these expressions make emotions perceptually manifest. Natural and idiosyncratic expressions always enable perception, whereas voluntary expressions always enable perception-as. Natural expressions may be distinguished from

⁷ Mitchell Green (2007, 12) distinguishes between three kinds of voluntary expressions: (1) those that are allowed to occur spontaneously without being willed, (2) those that are willed, and (3) those that are willed and overt. My category of “voluntary expressions” includes 2 and 3 but not 1.

⁸ An expression is “sincere” only if the expresser feels the emotion that she expresses. An expression is “non-sincere,” in turn, only if the expresser does not feel the emotion that she expresses. (See Green [1970, 556] for a helpful discussion of how the term “insincere” can be misleading in this context.) There are at least three ways in which an expression can be non-sincere: (1) a person can put on an expression when she feels no emotion; (2) a person can put on an expression that differs in kind from the emotion that she does feel; and (3) a person can put on an expression that differs in intensity from the emotion that she feels (Ekman & Friesen 2003, 141).

⁹ Alston (1965), Green (1970), Tormey (1971), Finn (1975), and Bar-On (2004), among others, insist that non-sincere expressions are not truly emotional expressions. Green (2007) argues that there are no such things as non-sincere *self*-expressions, although he allows for the possibility of non-sincere *expressions* more generally (see Green 2010b).

idiosyncratic expressions insofar as the former are more likely to enable perception-as. And it is because natural expressions typically enable perception-as that voluntary expressions can be mistaken for them. To my knowledge, I am the first to formulate the Perceptual Analysis in this particular way, and I shall argue this formulation provides a simple, elegant, and satisfying analysis of the concept of emotional expression.

2. Motivating the Perceptual Analysis

Why think that the Perceptual Analysis is correct? One compelling reason is that the Perceptual Analysis can answer a serious objection that faces a popular competitor, namely the *Evidential Analysis of Emotional Expression*.¹⁰ According to this analysis, behaviors express emotions by “indicating,” “signaling,” “showing,” or otherwise providing evidence of those emotions.¹¹ A smile expresses joy by indicating the expresser’s joy. A pout expresses sadness by signaling the expresser’s sadness. And a scowl expresses anger by showing the expresser’s anger. To be clear, the claim is

¹⁰ Had I more space, I would also demonstrate that the Perceptual Analysis outperforms another competitor, namely the *Hydraulic Analysis of Emotional Expression*, or the view that a behavior expresses an emotion just in case the emotion causes that behavior to occur. Though less popular than the Evidential Analysis, the Hydraulic Analysis has enjoyed a recent resurgence following Dorit Bar-On’s (2004) spirited defense of it. Very briefly, Bar-On distinguishes between “expressing” as a *process* and “expression” as a *product*, and argues that a behavior counts as an emotional expression just in case it was produced by the process of “airing,” “voicing,” “pressing out,” or “giving vent to one’s present state” (2004, 241, 257). Less metaphorically, a person expresses an emotion whenever her behavior “comes directly from” that emotion (2004, 254), which is to say that the emotion is either a brute or rational cause of that behavior (2004, 249). Any behavior brought about through this process is, accordingly, an “expression” of that emotion. I see two major problems with the Hydraulic Analysis. First, insincere expressions cannot be caused by the emotions they express. Second, coping behaviors are caused by emotions, yet do not express them (see below). Thus, the Hydraulic Analysis is both too narrow and too broad.

¹¹ See, for instance, Britton (1957, 101), Green (1970, 551), Tormey (1971, 43), Bach & Harnish (1979, 15), and Davis (1988, 280; 2003). Green’s (2007) analysis of self-expression overlaps with the Evidential Analysis insofar as he claims that signaling and showing—that a person experiences an emotion (namely by providing evidence of it) is sufficient—though not necessary—to express that emotion.

not simply that expressions often or even always do provide evidence of a person's mental states; rather, the claim is that the providing of evidence is *essential* to expression—that the providing of evidence is what distinguishes expressions from related behaviors.

Critics of the Evidential Analysis charge it with being too broad. After all, many behaviors indicate, signal, show, or otherwise provide evidence of a person's emotions without expressing them, and thus there is more to expression than the Evidential Analysis claims. Consider the following cases:

1. *Third-person reports.* If I am well acquainted with John, then my sincere, informed utterance of “John is sad” indicates that John is sad. My utterance is not, however, an “expression” of John's sadness; it is at best a “report” of it. Normally, the only person who can “express” John's sadness is John himself. So it's possible to indicate an emotion without expressing it (cf. Bar-On 2010, 217). An advocate of the Evidential Analysis can preempt this objection by defining “emotional expression” as any behavior that provides evidence of *the expresser's own* emotion—and no one else's.¹² But I find this qualification unsatisfying. Intuitively, there is more to the difference between expressing and reporting than *whose emotion* has been indicated. When we express our emotions, we are doing something different in kind from what we do when we report someone else's emotions. Therefore, there is more to expression than mere indication.
2. *First-person reports.* Just as there is a difference between expressing one's own emotions and reporting someone else's, so too is there a difference between expressing and reporting one's own emotions. Suppose that I am angry, but that I am not yet aware of my anger. I see my hand shaking, however, and I know that my hand only shakes like that when I am angry. Were I to infer aloud (in a calm, unemotional tone of voice), “I must be angry,” then I would have indicated my anger, but, intuitively, I would have not “expressed” it; at best, I would have “reported” it. Even in cases where I am directly aware of my emotions, it is possible for me to report my emotions

¹² Compare Green (2007, 212) and Bach & Harnish (1979, 15) with Davis (1988, 280).

without expressing them. Were someone to ask me, “Are you angry?” and were I to respond (again, in a calm, unemotional tone of voice), “As a matter of fact, I am,” then I would have reported my anger without having expressed it. So again, there is more to expression than mere indication.

3. *Coping strategies.* If I know that Mary copes with anger by closing her eyes and by calmly counting to ten, then this behavior indicates that Mary is angry. Calmly counting to ten is not, however, an “expression” of anger; rather, it is a method of “coping” with anger (Koch 1983). This is yet another example of a behavior that indicates an emotion without expressing it. An advocate of the Evidential Analysis could argue that expressions must serve no purpose beyond indicating an emotion, thereby disqualifying coping strategies (e.g. Davis 1988, 288). The problem is that some coping behaviors also count as expressions. Suppose that Mary is upset but tries not to cry. I say to her, “You should cry, Mary; it will make you feel better.” In this case, the shedding of tears is both an expression of Mary’s sadness and a way for her to cope with her sadness. Alternatively, an advocate of the Evidential Analysis could argue that expressions must be performed for the purpose of indicating an emotion (e.g. Green 2007, 5; Davis 1988, 282). But even if Mary did close her eyes and count to ten for the purpose of indicating her anger (suppose that she knows that I know that she copes with anger in this way), her coping behavior would not thereby be an “expression” of her anger. A further ingredient, beyond indication, is needed to make it an expression.

Each of these examples suggests that the Evidential Analysis is too broad: a behavior can indicate, signal, show, or otherwise provide evidence of an emotion without expressing it.

One reason to adopt the Perceptual Analysis is that it avoids the Evidential Analysis’ mistake. If we reconsider the above cases, we find that the Perceptual Analysis categorizes each behavior correctly:

1. *Third-person reports.* My sincere, informed utterance of “John is sad” indicates John’s sadness, but it does not directly enable you to

perceive John's sadness (or to perceive John as sad), and thus the Perceptual Analysis correctly predicts that my utterance is not an expression of John's sadness. Indeed, the concept of "directly enabling perception," as I've defined it, allows the Perceptual Analysis to distinguish clearly between expressing and reporting and to explain why we can express only our own emotions. By smiling, pouting, or growling, I directly enable you to perceive *my* joy, grief, or anger—and no one else's.

2. *First-person reports.* When I calmly and unemotionally state that I am angry as a result of observing my hand shaking, or as a result of being asked if I am angry, I neither look nor sound angry. Thus, the Perceptual Analysis correctly predicts that my utterance is not an expression of my anger.
3. *Coping strategies.* When Mary calmly counts to ten, she neither looks nor sounds angry, and thus, again, she does not express her anger. When Mary cries in order to feel better, on the other hand, she does look and sound sad, and thus the Perceptual Analysis correctly predicts that she has expressed her sadness.

In sum, the Perceptual Analysis avoids the Evidential Analysis' flaw of being too broad. Whenever a behavior indicates, signals, shows, or otherwise provides evidence of an emotion without expressing it, the Perceptual Analysis correctly predicts that this behavior does not enable the perception of that emotion.

Critics of the Perceptual Analysis may respond by arguing that it has its own problem: it is too narrow. Even if some expressions do enable the perception of emotion, others do not, and thus the enabling of the perception of emotion is not *necessary* for emotional expression. Consider the following counter-examples:

1. *Idiosyncratic Expressions.* I began this paper by noting that smiles, pouts, and growls are expressions of emotion whereas coughing and wheezing are not. But surely there are situations in which a person *could* express an emotion by coughing or by wheezing. We might worry that an observer who hears the expressive cough or wheeze won't hear an emotion in it, and thus that the Perceptual Analysis will

fail to classify the expressive cough or wheeze as an emotional expression. (I've already sketched how the Perceptual Analysis will accommodate such expressions in §1.3, above, but I still owe a defense of this explanation.)

2. *Non-Sincere Expressions.* Wayne Davis (1988) argues that there is an important difference between the locutions "S expressed fear" and "S expressed her fear." The latter implies that S is afraid; the former does not. When a person expresses an emotion that she is not presently experiencing, that expression is "non-sincere." In such cases, there isn't an emotion to be made perceptible, and thus we may worry that the Perceptual Analysis will be unable to classify non-sincere expressions as emotional expressions. (Again, although I already sketched my response to this objection in §1.3, I still owe an argument.)
3. *Linguistic Expressions.* A person can express joy by exclaiming "I am overjoyed," grief by moaning "I am utterly crestfallen," and anger by growling "I am pissed off." Although non-linguistic emotional expressions plausibly enable the perception of emotion, linguistic expressions do not. An observer hears a linguistic expression and understands its meaning, without necessarily hearing the expresser's emotion or hearing the expresser as emotional. Thus, we might worry that the Perceptual Analysis will fail to classify linguistic expressions of emotion as emotional expressions.
4. *Expressions of Belief.* There are facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice characteristic of particular emotions. As a result, a person who performs one of these expressions will look or sound emotional, and thus it's plausible to think that natural expressions of emotion enable observers to perceive emotion in both ways. However, there are no facial expressions, gestures, or tones of voice characteristic of particular beliefs, e.g. the belief that Paris is west of Berlin. It is certainly possible to express this belief (e.g. by asserting, "Paris is west of Berlin"), but since there isn't a way that a person looks or sounds when believing this, the expression of this belief will not enable the perception of it. Thus, if we think that an analysis of emotional expression ought to be generalizable to account for the expressions of other mental states as well, then we may worry that the

Perceptual Analysis will not be so generalizable. (If we deny the antecedent, however, then the failure of the Perceptual Analysis to generalize would not count against it.)

Advocates of the Evidential Analysis could argue that their analysis easily accommodates these types of expression, which, all things being equal, do indicate or otherwise provide evidence of the expresser's state of mind. I shall consider each of these objections in great detail below, arguing that the Perceptual Analysis does, in fact, have the resources to overcome them.

3. Defending the Perceptual Analysis

Having argued that the Perceptual Analysis can overcome a powerful objection facing a popular competitor, I shall now argue that it can also overcome five major objections facing it. The first objection targets the weaker modal claim that expressions *can* at times make emotions perceptually manifest.¹³ The subsequent objections target the stronger conceptual claim that expressions *essentially* make emotions perceptually manifest. Objections two through four identify behaviors that we intuitively identify as emotional expressions, and charge that the Perceptual Analysis fails to categorize such behaviors correctly as emotional expressions. My responses to these objections support the conclusion that *all*—and not only *some*—actual and possible emotional expressions enable the perception of emotion. The final objection identifies behaviors that we intuitively identify as *mental state* expressions (though not as *emotional* expressions), and charges that the Perceptual Analysis cannot be generalized to account for these expressions. My response to this objection shows that the enabling of the perception of a mental state is necessary and sufficient for all mental state expressions, and not only emotional expressions. In sum, my responses to these five objections constitute a compelling case for the stronger conceptual claim that emotional expressions *essentially* enable the perception of emotion.

¹³ I assume that if the weaker modal claim is false, then the stronger conceptual claim must also be false.

3.1. Objection 1: The Perceptibility of Emotion

The first objection against the Perceptual Analysis states that we *cannot* perceive an emotion in its expression. Although there is something intuitively satisfying in the claim that we can perceive joy in a person's smile, sadness in her pout, and anger in her growl, this claim cannot literally be true (see Green 2007, 89-91; Stout 2010; Green 2010a). After all, an emotion is not the sort of thing that can be perceived. We could give this objection a Rylean spin: one commits a category mistake in saying, "I am looking at Mary's face, and although I see her eyes, her nose, and her mouth, I can't seem to find her fear." Mary's fear is not literally a part of her face, and thus a person who looks at Mary's face cannot literally see her fear.

The classic response to this objection was first suggested by Stuart Hampshire (1976, 74-75), but was later developed in detail by Alan Tormey (1971, 47-48) and Mitchell Green (2007, 84-93; 2010a). We can literally perceive a person's emotion in her expression, these philosophers argue, because (1) expressions are components of emotions and (2) perceiving a component of an entity is sufficient for having perceived that entity. The first premise is supported by empirical research, the second by the logic of perception. Let's consider them in reverse order.

When I look out my window, I can see a dozen hippies forming a drum circle. Naturally, I do not see every part of these hippies; rather, I see only a few scattered parts of them. I see noses peeking out from behind long dreadlocks and scraggly beards. I see hands emerging from the sleeves of dusty Bajas. And I see shoeless, calloused feet tapping in time with the Djembes. Yet, despite the fact that I have seen only parts of these hippies, no one would deny that I have the hippies themselves. If I've seen Dylan's nose, for instance, then I've seen *Dylan*. If I've seen Blossom's foot, then I've seen *Blossom*. Green dubs this kind of perception "part-whole perception," and defines it as follows: in seeing part of an entity, one has thereby seen that entity (which is not to say that one has seen every part of it) (Green 2007, 86-87). Thus, should it turn out that an expression is a part of an emotion, then, by seeing an expression, one has thereby seen the emotion.¹⁴

¹⁴ Stout (2010) objects to Green's claim, although I am persuaded by Green's (2010a) subsequent response (see also Bar-On 2010). Green (2007, 89) goes on to add that, in some

The claim that expressions are components of emotions may ring counter-intuitive to many. Psychological surveys confirm that the folk identify emotions with feelings (Panskepp 2000; cited in Prinz 2004, 4). However, the difficulties of defining emotions in terms of feelings are well known (Deigh 1994), and thus we have some reason to think that the folk may be mistaken. According to a remarkably successful research program that integrates findings from behavioral psychology, affective neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, emotions are complex psycho-physiological processes that often include perceptions, appraisals, feelings, expressions, and action tendencies (Tomkins 1964; Izard 1977; Ekman 1994; Griffiths 1997, 77; Russell 2003; Scherer 2005; Green 2007a, 88-90). “Fear,” for instance, names the entire process beginning with the perception of a bear, followed by the appraisal of that bear as dangerous, the sinking feeling in the pit of one’s stomach, the widening of one’s eyes, the increased heart rate, perspiration, and ending with the tendency to run in the opposite direction. Feelings may be an essential component of emotion, as the folk believe, but they are not the only component. Expressions stand out from the other components in that they can be directly perceived by observers. Two qualifications are needed.

First, expressions are not *essential* components of emotions. It may be possible to experience an emotion without expressing it outwardly. Second, only *some* expressions are components of emotions. For an expression to be considered a component, it must be a coordinated change in the somatic nervous system (Izard 1977, 48-49; Scherer 2005, 698; Scherer 2009, 1309), which occurs spontaneously as part of an emotional episode. Both natural and idiosyncratic expressions qualify as components of emotions, then, whereas voluntary expressions do not.

Granting, then, that expressions are components of emotions, and that perceiving a part of an entity is sufficient for having perceived that entity, it follows that we are able literally to perceive the emotions of others.¹⁵

cases, observers may require certain conceptual capacities in order to perceive an emotion in its expression. I think this is a mistake. Certain conceptual capacities may be necessary to perceive a behavior *as* emotional, but not to perceive an emotion via part-whole perception. In another mood, Green (2007, 141) appears to agree.

¹⁵ For alternative answers to this objection, see Overgaard (2006) and Gallagher & Zahavi (2012, 201-204).

According to the version of the Perceptual Analysis defended here, natural and idiosyncratic expressions always enable the part-whole perception of emotion (since they are components of emotions), which is a species of perception, regardless of whether they also enable perception-as. Voluntary expressions never enable perception (since they are not components of emotions), although they do enable perception-as.

3.2. Objection 2: Idiosyncratic Expressions

My response to the first objection demonstrates that emotional expressions *can* make emotions perceptually manifest. However, it does not follow that emotional expressions *essentially* make emotions perceptually manifest, since there could very well be other examples of emotional expressions that fail to make emotions perceptually manifest. To defend the stronger conceptual claim, I shall consider a series of objections to it, each of which charges the Perceptual Analysis with failing to accommodate a specific type of emotional expression.

In this section, I shall consider the objection that the Perceptual Analysis fails to account for idiosyncratic (either in the sense of individual- or species-atypical) expressions. A person who expresses anger in the usual ways—e.g. clenched fists, scowls, and sneers—looks and sounds angry to normal observers (Smith 2015). We perceive this person’s behavior, and we perceive immediately that the person is angry. Indeed, research suggests that we are “wired up” to perceive expressions in this way. Newborn infants respond differentially to facial expressions (Reddy 2008), as do adults when they are flashed images of angry faces so quickly that they are not aware of what they have seen (Morris et al. 1999). However, a person who expresses anger in a completely idiosyncratic way—e.g. by raising an eyebrow or by wiggling a toe—does not look or sound angry. Thus, we may worry that the Perceptual Analysis will incorrectly predict that idiosyncratic expressions are not expressions at all.¹⁶

¹⁶ Although my formulation of the Perceptual Analysis can overcome this objection, any formulation that takes the enabling of perception-as to be necessary for expression will have difficulty doing so (e.g. Taylor 1979). Green’s analysis of self-expression can accommodate

However, it does not follow from the premise that a person perceives x to the conclusion that the person *is aware* of perceiving x (Green 2007, 89, 140-141).¹⁷ Indeed, this person may be completely mistaken about what she has seen. When people on the street mistake me for an incredibly attractive celebrity, for instance, they *believe* that they have seen this celebrity, but in fact they have seen only me. Analogously, in the case of idiosyncratic expressions, a person can perceive such expressions even if she does not know what she has seen. Mary might idiosyncratically express sadness by laughing hysterically, for instance. If I see Mary laughing, then I might believe that I have seen her joy, even though in fact I have seen her grief. Should laughing turn out to be an individual-typical expression of sadness for Mary, however, then a person who knows Mary better than I do may know that she expresses her sadness in this way. And when this person sees Mary laughing, she is more likely to be aware of what she has seen, and hence more likely to see her as sad. As long as the idiosyncratic expression is still a component of the emotion in question, which it is as long as it is a coordinated change in the somatic nervous system, it will enable the perception of that emotion, and thus my formulation of the Perceptual Analysis is able to classify it correctly as an expression.

3.3. Objection 3: Non-Sincere Expressions

Wayne Davis (2008) objects to Green's (2007) analysis of expression on the ground that it excludes the possibility of non-sincere expression.¹⁸ A person can express sadness by pouting, Davis claims, even if this person is not feeling sad. (By "non-sincere expression," I mean simply the expression of an emotion that one does not feel; polite smiles and play-acted expressions are "non-sincere" on this definition, regardless of whether they are performed

individual-typical self-expressions (2007, 89, 140-141), but not individual-atypical self-expressions.

¹⁷ Some philosophers argue that perceiving does entail awareness of what one has seen (e.g. Searle 2015). I am persuaded by arguments to the contrary (e.g. Dretske 2006), but I concede that the truth of the Perceptual Analysis depends upon the falsity of that view of perceiving.

¹⁸ However, Green (2007) is giving an account of "self-expression," rather than of "expression" more generally, and thus Davis' objection, while raising an important fact about expression, misses its mark. See Green (2010b).

with the intention to deceive, or are “insincere.”) Insofar as a non-sincere expression of sadness is not a component of the expresser’s sadness, an observer who perceives the expression does not thereby perceive an emotion via part-whole perception.

There are two ways of responding to Davis’ objection. First, we could deny that so-called non-sincere expressions ought to be counted as true expressions, and thus deny that Davis’ objection should be taken seriously. Alternatively, we could argue that the Perceptual Analysis can indeed accommodate non-sincere expressions, and thus argue that Davis’ objection can be overcome. I shall pursue the second approach here, for several reasons. First, intuitions about whether non-sincere expressions ought to count as true “expressions” vary radically from philosopher to philosopher.¹⁹ Given that intuitions vary as much as they do, we ought not to place too much weight on these intuitions when theorizing about the nature of expression. Absent some independent reason to exclude non-sincere expressions from the class of emotional expressions, our analyses ought to be able to accommodate them. Relatedly, I am suspicious of any attempt to police the proper use of “expression” from the armchair. A quick Google search reveals that the folk often and unhesitatingly refer to non-sincere expressions as “expressions,” and, again, without some reason to think that they are mistaken, other than a philosopher’s contrary intuition, we ought not to exclude non-sincere expressions from consideration. Finally, many philosophers analyze emotional expressions, rightly to my mind, as *reliable signals* (e.g. Green 2007; Bar-On 2010). In other words, expressions are observable behaviors that evolved or were otherwise designed to indicate that the expresser has a particular unobservable feeling, namely an emotion. Reliable signals have a high probability of being sincere, but, importantly, they are not necessarily sincere (Maynard Smith & Harper 2004, 46). If emotional expressions are reliable signals, then the probability of them being sincere is less than one, and thus some emotional expressions are non-sincere. For these reasons and others, I agree with Davis that the Perceptual Analysis ought to be able to accommodate non-sincere expressions.

¹⁹ Alston (1965), Green (1970), Tormey (1971), Finn (1975), Bar-On (2004), among others, insist that non-sincere expressions are not truly emotional expressions. Goodman (1976), Bach & Harnish (1979), Taylor (1979), Davis (1988; 2003), and Eriksson (2010), among others, take it to be equally obvious that expressions can be non-sincere.

The Perceptual Analysis can indeed accommodate non-sincere expressions, because such expressions enable observers to view the expresser as emotional, even if they do not enable the part-whole perception of emotion. Let us say that a behavior enables the perception of an agent as emotional (angry, sad, happy, etc.) if and only if this behavior resembles a component of an emotion and an observer registers this resemblance (cf. Brewer 2011, 121-122; quoted in Smith 2015).²⁰ Thus, a smile enables the perception of an agent as joyous just in case an observer registers the resemblance between this smile and smiles that are components of joy. There are other ways of analyzing perception-as (e.g. Hanson 1958; Kivy 1980; Orlandi 2011; Smith 2015), however, and the argument here relies on no analysis in particular. All I need is the claim that observers can perceive a feigned smile as happy, a feigned pout as sad, and a feigned growl as angry. Non-sincere expressions are like illusions. Even if we know that a feigned smile is not genuine, we often cannot help but see the person as happy, where this illusory perceptual experience may be indistinguishable from a veridical perceptual experience of that person's happiness. The enabling of the perception of a behavior as emotional is sufficient, on my analysis, to make that behavior an expression of emotion. Two comments in order.

First, this analysis treats non-sincere expressions as observer-relative. In other words, behaviors count as expressions for particular observers only, depending on whether they are able to perceive the behavior as emotional (cf. Tormey 1971, 44-45). Analyzing non-sincere expressions in this way helps to explain why observers tend to be promiscuous in their ascriptions of emotional expressions. Not only pouts and tears, but also weeping willows, St. Bernards' jowls, and slumping IKEA desk lamps "show up" to people as sad, leading them to say that such entities non-sincerely "express" sadness. Furthermore, this analysis helps us to make sense of attempted but failed non-sincere expressions. When the soap opera actor rends his shirt and grimaces, he is trying to enable his audience to see him as grieved, but, sadly, the audience sees him only as untalented.

²⁰ The fact that a behavior resembles a component of an emotion does not entail that the behavior is not a component of an emotion. On my view, natural expressions resemble characteristic components of emotions whereas idiosyncratic expressions do not, although both are in fact components of emotions.

Second, the perception of a behavior as emotional—even when this perception is illusory—presupposes the veridical perception of that behavior. Thus, although it’s possible, on my view, for a behavior to express a non-existent emotion (namely, by enabling the illusory perception of that behavior as emotional), it’s not possible for a non-existent behavior to express anything. Suppose that I hallucinate a woman smiling. Despite the fact that I have perceived this woman as happy, my analysis does not entail the existence of a phantom expression, since no behavior is in fact responsible for enabling this perception.

Philosophers who want to insist that expressions are necessarily sincere might suggest that so-called non-sincere expressions are “expressive” of emotion, but not truly “expressions” of emotion, where a behavior is “expressive” just in case it looks like an expression but isn’t really one, on account of its being non-sincere (Tormey 1971; Kivy 1980; Green 2007). However, as long as such philosophers analyze “expressiveness” in terms of the enabling of perception-as (e.g. Kivy 1980; Davies 1980), it seems to me that we are in agreement about the nature of the phenomenon, and disagreeing only about how the word “expression” ought to be applied in rigorous philosophical discourses. I’ve given my reasons for thinking that even non-sincere expressions ought to be counted as true “expressions,” but I’m happy to call such behaviors “expressive” if these reasons fail to convince.

3.4. Objection 4: Linguistic Expressions

Intuitively, we can express joy by exclaiming “Woohoo,” sadness by moaning “I am utterly crestfallen,” and anger by yelling “I am pissed off.”²¹ Wittgenstein suggested, not implausibly, that human beings learn over time to replace natural, non-linguistic expressions of feeling with conventional, linguistic expressions (2006, §244). Thus, a person who is overcome by joy may express her feelings by smiling or clapping, on the one hand, or by

²¹ Davis (1988; 2003), Bar-On (2004), and Green (2007) offer spirited defenses of the claim that language is a means of emotional expression. A more comprehensive defense of the claim that language is *not* a means of emotional expression would need to address their arguments directly, a task that I must unfortunately put off for another day.

saying “Woohoo” or “I am happy,” on the other (Bar-On 2004, 252-257). The former expressions are non-linguistic; the latter are linguistic.

Linguistic expressions pose a problem for the Perceptual Analysis for the following reasons. First, although various non-linguistic expressions are classified as components of emotions, and thus enable the part-whole perception of emotion, linguistic expressions are never classified as components of emotions, and thus do not enable the part-whole perception of emotion (Izard 1977, 48-49; Scherer 2005, 698; Scherer 2009, 1309). (Were we to classify linguistic expressions as components of emotions, however, then the objection would lose its grip.²²) Second, although various non-linguistic expressions enable the perception of someone as emotional, the production of language never enables the perception of someone as emotional, since linguistic utterances do not resemble the components of emotions in the relevant ways. (Again, were we to claim that the use of language could enable the perception of a speaker as emotional, then the objection would lose its grip.²³) In sum, linguistic expressions do not make emotions perceptually manifest, and thus the Perceptual Analysis is unable to accommodate such expressions. Dorit Bar-On (2010, 223-226) suggests that this is the most important objection that the Perceptual Analysis must overcome.²⁴

In response to this objection, I shall argue that although speech acts can indeed express emotions, they do so always in virtue of *how* they are said,

²² Bar-On (2004, 299) makes a strong case for linguistic utterances becoming components of mental states as they become habitual responses to specific stimuli. Thus, if “Ouch!” or “That hurts!” is a spontaneous response to stubbing one’s toe, then it is as much a component of pain as is a wince. However, I follow psychologists in classifying expressions as components of emotions only if they are coordinated changes in the somatic nervous system. Since the production of language is never such a change, I conclude that linguistic utterances are never components of emotions.

²³ The best candidates for language that enables the perception of someone as emotional would be metaphors and poetry. My take, however, is that metaphors and poetry typically evoke emotions without expressing them.

²⁴ As I read her, Bar-On responds to this objection by giving up on the Perceptual Analysis. She argues that linguistic expressions replace non-linguistic ones, and that, while the latter do indeed enable the perception of emotion, the former do not. Rather, the former express emotion by being produced by the same kind of causal process that produces the latter. See note 10 for more on Bar-On’s view, and why I disagree with it.

and never in virtue of *what* they say.²⁵ More precisely, an utterance of, say, “I am happy” counts as an expression of joy just in case the speaker utters these words with a tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture that itself expresses joy. The paralinguistic behavior is the vehicle of expression; the linguistic utterance is along for the ride. Assuming that I am right, the Perceptual Analysis can be saved: a speaker expresses her joy insofar as she looks or sounds happy while saying something, and not for any other reason. To support this conclusion, I shall argue that certain paralinguistic behaviors are both necessary and sufficient to make a speech act an expression of emotion. Language *interfaces* with the non-linguistic expression of emotion in several crucial ways, as we shall see, but it is not a *means* (or *vehicle*) of emotional expression per se.

To begin, I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that certain paralinguistic behaviors are *sufficient* to make a speech act an expression of emotion. If we agree that a person’s tone expresses anger, for instance, then we ought to agree that her speech act expresses anger too, regardless of what she says. Were she to growl “I am pissed off,” then of course we would take her speech act to express anger. Were she to growl something that has nothing whatsoever to do with anger—e.g. “Take your next left!”—then, again, we would agree that her speech act has expressed anger. Even if she were to bang her fist on the table and shout, “I am *not* angry,” we’d say that her speech act is an expression of anger. Empirical studies confirm that my intuition is widely felt. In one set of experiments, psychologists recorded actors speaking nonsensical pseudo-sentences—e.g. “*Hat sundig pron you venzy*”—in tones of voice corresponding to a variety of emotions, and then played the tapes back to participants, who had little difficulty identifying which emotions the actors had expressed (Banse & Scherer 1996). In another set of experiments, psychologists had actors claim to be feeling one emotion while displaying paralinguistic behaviors evocative of another emotion, and then asked subjects which emotion the actor had expressed. 93% of the time, subjects judged that the actor had expressed an emotion that was displayed paralinguistically (Mehrabian & Ferris 1967; Mehrabian & Wiener 1967). Thus, there is general agreement that speech acts spoken sadly express

²⁵ I am by no means the first to advocate such a view (Wollheim 1968, 228; Green 1970, 563). However, I believe that I am the first to defend it and to explore its implications.

sadness, that speech acts spoken happily express happiness, that speech acts spoken angrily express anger, and so on.

Far more controversial is the claim that certain paralinguistic behaviors are *necessary* to make a speech act an expression of emotion. Although utterances of “I am happy” are typically spoken joyously, it certainly seems possible for an utterance of “I am happy” to express joy without being spoken joyously—that is, without being accompanied by paralinguistic behaviors that themselves express joy. Insofar as my response to the above objection states that it is impossible for an utterance to express joy without being spoken joyously, those who have the intuition that it is possible will be unmoved. To persuade the skeptics, I will first offer an intuition pump to draw out the intuition that it is indeed impossible for a speech act to express an emotion without paralinguistic behaviors that express that emotion, and then I will explain why intuitions to the contrary are misleading.

Let’s return to our poor soap opera actor. After his debut performance, the critics complain that his acting was “wooden,” that he consistently failed to express the emotions that his character was supposed to be feeling. What did the actor do wrong? The writing may have been partly to blame. Perhaps his lines were so bad that even the best actors would have struggled to give a convincing performance. But even the best writing can’t make up for bad acting. In order for the actor to express his character’s emotions, he must do more than read the lines he’s been given, no matter how authentic or eloquent those lines may be; he must *deliver* those lines naturally. And to do that, he must speak his lines with the appropriate facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice. Without the correct delivery—that is, without the correct paralinguistic behaviors—his speech acts will fail to express his character’s emotions. Here we can feel the pull of the intuition that paralinguistic behaviors are not only sufficient for emotional expression, but also necessary.²⁶

But surely there are situations in which the “correct” delivery of an emotional expression is in fact a “neutral” delivery. Angry people don’t always express their anger by shouting or by stamping their feet; sometimes, angry people express their anger by coolly and calmly stating, “I’ve had it

²⁶ Indeed, clinicians who specialize in prosody disorders, which impair individuals’ ability to inflect their speech with emotional tones of voice, conclude that such individuals cannot express their emotions in speech act all (Marchi et al. 2009).

with you,” or even “You’re making me angry.” Am I denying that such utterances express anger? Not quite. Recall that the Perceptual Analysis is consistent with the possibility of idiosyncratic expression. Under certain circumstances, a “neutral” sounding tone of voice can, in fact, be a component of a speaker’s anger, and can thereby enable the direct perception of that anger. Observers may not recognize the tone as angry—it may sound perfectly “neutral” to them—but it still would be an expression of anger. Had this person spoken in another tone of voice, the thought runs, then the speech act wouldn’t have been an expression of anger at all. In sum, paralinguistic behaviors are never independent of expression; rather, paralinguistic behaviors constitute expressions, which is not to say that the same types of paralinguistic behaviors always constitute the same types of expressions. In cases of idiosyncratic expressions, even tones of voice and facial expressions that appear “neutral” can turn out to express emotion.

That being said, I contend that it is a mistake to assume that anytime a person uses language to communicate that she is experiencing an emotion, she is thereby “expressing” that emotion. In fact, the expression of emotion is but one species of communication about emotion. Wittgenstein illustrated this point nicely:

Are the words “I am afraid” a description of a state of mind?

I say “I am afraid”; someone else asks me: “What was that? A cry of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your present state?”—Could I always give him some clear answer?

Could I never give him one?

We can imagine all sort of things here, for example:

“No, no! I am afraid!”

“I am afraid. I am sorry to have to confess it.”

“I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before.”

“At bottom I am still afraid, though I won’t confess it to myself.”

“I torment myself with all sort of fears.”

“Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!”

To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate, and a different context...

[T]he words “I am afraid” may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be *far* removed from it. (2006, 160-161)

The takeaway point is that we can use language to talk about our feelings in a variety of ways that do not necessarily amount to “expressions” of those feelings. Suppose that Jim suffers from clinical depression and is seeking therapy. One day, his therapist begins the session by asking him how he feels. Jim introspects, and is surprised to find that, for the first time in recent memory, he is feeling quite happy. He answers, in a surprised tone of voice, “I didn’t realize it until you asked, Doc, but I’m actually feeling happy today!” Here, Jim is certainly *communicating* that he is happy, but he is not *expressing* his happiness. If his speech act expresses any emotion, it expresses surprise. (Were Jim to say the same thing in a joyful tone of voice, however, then he would be expressing his happiness.)

Dorit Bar-On (2004, 216), following Wilfred Sellars (1969, 520-521), draws an important distinction between the expression of a proposition (or “semantic expression”) and the expression of a mental state (or “mental state expression”), such as an emotion. The distinction that I am proposing is closely related. We often express propositions about our emotions in order to communicate that we are feeling those emotions, but it would be a mistake to conclude that every time we communicate that we are feeling an emotion, we thereby express that emotion. Returning to Wittgenstein’s examples, only the utterances of “I am afraid” that resemble a cry are clear-cut “expressions” of fear. The other utterances exemplify different ways of communicating that a speaker is afraid. And what distinguishes the expression of an emotion from other ways of communicating an emotion is, I argue, the presence of paralinguistic behaviors that themselves express that emotion. The cool and calm utterance of “You’re making me angry” may be an idiosyncratic expression of anger, but it’s more likely to be an act of communicating anger that doesn’t amount to an expression of that anger. (As we saw in §2, a major problem with the Evidential Analysis is that it tends to treat *every* act of indicating an emotion as an expression of that emotion.)

The distinction between expressing and otherwise communicating an emotion helps us to see why I am not denying that we can perform so-called “expressive” illocutionary acts—such as apologizing, thanking, and

congratulating—without speaking in an expressive tone or with an expressive gesture. My claim is that, in such cases, these illocutionary acts simply fall short of *expressing* the emotions in question, even if they succeed in otherwise communicating those emotions. Now, some speech act theorists infer from the fact that speech acts have sincerity conditions to the conclusion that they express the states specified in their sincerity conditions (e.g. Alston 1965, 26; Searle 1969, 65; Bach and Harnish 1979). Thus, because an apology is sincere only if the speaker is in fact remorseful, an apology must be an expression of remorse. However, I contend that there is an intuitive sense in which an apology can fail to express remorse, even if the speaker indeed feels remorseful. As a child, I hated being told by my parents to apologize for anything. (I believed, incorrectly, that an apology was meaningless if commanded.) So when prompted to apologize, I would mutter a perfunctory “I’m sorry” before scurrying off to my room, *even if I did feel remorse over what I had done*. And my parents would rightly chastise me afterward for failing to express my remorse in my apology. Thus, the fact that remorse is specified in the sincerity condition of an apology does not imply that apologies always express remorse. An apology that is not spoken remorsefully—that is, with a remorseful tone or gesture—communicates that one is remorseful, and has the force of an apology, but fails to express remorse.

In sum, whether a speech act counts as an expression of emotion or not depends in every case on how the words are spoken—i.e. on the paralinguistic aspects of the speech act. To be an expression of emotion, a speech act must be spoken with a tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture that makes an emotion perceptually manifest, which is just what the Perceptual Analysis predicts.²⁷

²⁷ Surely we can express our emotions in writing. However, when we write, we record only *what* we wish to say, and not *how* we wish to say it. A spoken utterance of “I am sorry” can be accompanied by a regretful tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture. A written inscription of “I am sorry” cannot. Thus, if a speech act must be accompanied by such nonverbal behaviors to count as an expression, then it would seem to follow that written language cannot be used to express our emotions at all. But, intuitively, we can express our emotions in writing, so there must be something wrong with my view.

In response, I contend that Perceptual Analysis, far from contradicting the possibility of written expression, in fact sheds light on how the written expression of emotion works. Although it is true that our facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice are not preserved

Allow me briefly to mention a corollary of this conclusion, which will be instrumental in answering the fifth objection. If the expression of emotion is fundamentally non-linguistic, as I have argued, then what a behavior expresses is in every case a *type* (and *intensity*) of emotion. A trembling voice expresses (mild) fear; a puffed out chest expresses (great) pride; and a snuffle expresses (moderate) sadness. However, these expressions do not specify the *content* of the emotion expressed. Regardless of whether I am afraid of bears or wolves, my trembling voice expresses only fear. Regardless of whether I am proud of my son or my daughter, my puffed out chest expresses only pride. And regardless of whether I am sad about losing my lease or my lover, my snuffle expresses only sadness. Of course, I might supplement my expression with a gesture or glance that ostends to the object of my emotion, enabling you to know why I am moved emotionally, but this act of ostension is distinct from my emotional expression. Expressions are,

in writing, we can nevertheless *substitute* for these nonverbal behaviors in a number of interesting ways. An obvious example involves the use of emoji. By inserting a smiley face into a text, we substitute for the real smile that would accompany a spoken utterance of the same words. More interesting are the ways in which we substitute for vocal prosody (tones of voice). We use (1) typographical styling, (2) punctuation, and (3) nonstandard spellings, among other techniques, to insert a dimension of tone into our writings. By italicizing a word, for instance, we substitute for the vocal emphasis that we deploy in speech. By ending a sentence with an exclamation mark instead of a period, we substitute for an emotionally excited tone of voice. And by using nonstandard spellings, we turn the reader's attention to *how* something would be said in speech, beyond simply *what* has been said. Take the following line of dialogue from *Huckleberry Finn*: "Oh, Huck, I bust out a-cryin' en grab her up in my arms, en say, 'Oh, de po' little thing! De Lord God Amighty fogive po' ole Jim, kaze he never gwyne to fogive hisself as long's he live!'" We do not just read and understand Jim's words; we imaginatively hear them being spoken with a particular accent, with particular emphases, and with particular affects.

Context also plays a crucial role, since these techniques will be more or less effective, depending on the context (Yigit 2005). Furthermore, context can influence how we read default sentences, or sentences that lack alternative stylings, punctuation, and spelling. In so-called "task-functional contexts," where an author is interested in conveying information rather than expressing his or her mental states, readers do not read tone into default sentences. In so-called "socio-emotional contexts," by contrast, where an author is interested in expressing his or her mental states rather than conveying information, readers do read tone into default sentences, thereby reading them as expressions (Yigit 2005). Much more on this topic needs to be said, and I am developing an account of written expression elsewhere. The take-away point is that, for writing as well as for speech, it's not *what* one says that matters for expression, it's *how* one says it.

in a word, opaque: though every emotion expressed may have a particular content, this content is not specified in its expression.

Here is one place where language interfaces with expression.²⁸ We can use language to *articulate* our emotions, or to communicate the contents of our emotions to others. Although a cowering utterance of “I am afraid you will hit me” expresses the same thing as a cowering utterance of “I am afraid you will leave me,” namely fear, the use of language to communicate the contents of the speaker’s fear distinguishes them. Thus, I draw a sharp distinction between non-linguistically “expressing” an emotion and linguistically “articulating” an emotion, which is but one of many ways of communicating linguistically about our emotions.²⁹ (My response to objection 5, below, demonstrates the fruitfulness of drawing this distinction.)

²⁸ It’s not the only place. Language is also used to “punctuate” expressions, or to call attention to *how* we say something. When I say “I’m sorry,” for instance, I call upon you to attend to my tone and facial expression, since it’s them, and not my words, that will ultimately convince you that I am indeed sorry.

²⁹ Bar-On (2004, ch. 6) also discusses the “articulation” of expressed mental states, but does not distinguish expression from articulation as starkly as I do. In particular, Bar-On claims that articulation is sometimes sufficient for expression (cf. Davis 1988, 283-284), a claim that I deny. Similarly, Mitchel Green (2007, 13-14) claims that self-expressions are *translucent* in the sense that they can convey both the type and the content of an emotion. However, this claim conflates what I am calling “expression” and “articulation.” Notice that we can use language to articulate the content of an emotion without at the same time expressing that emotion. When I stoically report that I have lost my job, home, and lover, I have informed you of why I am sad—i.e. the content of my sadness—even though I have not expressed my sadness to you. When I speak the identical words to you in a pitiful tone of voice, I express the same thing that I express by simply crying, namely sadness. Neither the tone of voice nor the tears express the content of my sadness. Motivating Green’s conflation, I believe, is a version of the familiar *de re/de dicto* ambiguity. The claim, “Anya expressed her fear of bunnies,” admits of two readings: Anya can *de re* express her fear of bunnies by expressing a type of emotion, namely fear, regardless of whether Anya also articulates the content of her fear. Anya can *de dicto* express her fear of bunnies, on the other hand, by expressing both the type and content of emotion, namely fear of bunnies. The arguments of this section support my conclusion that it is possible to express a fear of bunnies *de re*, but not to express that fear *de dicto*. What appears to be a *de dicto* expression is in fact a nonverbal expression of fear coupled with a verbal articulation of the content of that fear.

3.5. Objection 5: Expressions of Belief

I have just argued that emotional expressions are fundamentally non-linguistic. Although we can express our emotions through speech, it is always *how* we say something, rather than *what* we say, that does the expressing. A critic of the Perceptual Analysis could respond by noting that while this may be true of *emotional* expressions, it is surely false of other types of mental state expressions, especially beliefs. For instance, some philosophers have argued that the only way we can express our beliefs is through language (Green 1970, 562-563; Hampshire 1976, 80), while others have asserted outright that beliefs, unlike emotions, cannot be made perceptible in their expressions (Green 2007, 25, 71, 92). Thus, even if the Perceptual Analysis illuminates the expression of emotion, it fails to illuminate the expression of other mental states, especially those of beliefs, and thus it fails to give us a generalizable account of mental state expression. Granted, we may have some reason to think that the expression of emotion is different in principle from the expressions of other mental states, in which case it would not be a problem for the Perceptual Analysis that it does not generalize. However, I shall assume for the sake of argument that we do not have such a reason and that the Perceptual Analysis ought to be generalizable.

This objection seems to be motivated by the following sort of comparison: although I can easily express my fear of bunnies without language (e.g. by screaming), I cannot easily express my belief that Paris is west of Berlin without language. However, this way of putting the point fails to distinguish between expression and articulation. Once we make this distinction, we will see that the two cases are in fact perfectly symmetrical. A scream expresses a state of *fear*, for instance, without expressing the content of that fear. To communicate what I'm afraid of, I must typically use language or ostensive gestures. In just the same way, although I must typically use language or ostensive gestures to communicate the contents of my beliefs, I can express an occurrent attitude of *belief* without using language.³⁰ We don't often think about how a person looks or sounds when

³⁰ Although beliefs are dispositional states, whenever we *express* a belief we express an occurrent attitude toward the content of that belief. Thus, even though I may believe that Paris is west of Berlin without thinking about it, I cannot express the belief that Paris is west

believing something that he or she is thinking about, but several decades of empirical research into vocal expressions support the conclusion that people speak in different tones of voice when they are *certain* of something, when *speculating* about it, when *considering* it, when *uncertain* of it, and so on (e.g. Banse & Scherer 1996). Indeed, this fact is supported by common sense. When watching *Jeopardy*, we can easily tell when someone is expressing a belief and when she is expressing a guess based on the sound of her voice alone, given that the words she uses would be the same in each case (e.g. “Who is Benjamin Franklin?”).

Similarly, recent work on so-called “hand-over-face gestures” (e.g. scratching one’s chin, covering one’s mouth, shifting one’s glasses) has found that specific gestures express particular cognitive states (Mahmoud & Robinson 2011). Consider: when reading *Calvin and Hobbes*, we can tell whether Calvin is expressing a belief, venturing a guess, or displaying uncertainty on the basis of his body language alone. When Calvin expresses a conviction, he points his finger into the air and closes his eyes. When he ventures a guess, he scratches his chin and looks up out of the corner of his eye. And when he is uncertain of something, he tilts his head and twists his mouth. Thus, although the belief *that p* is not manifested in different behavior from the belief *that q*, the *belief that p* is indeed manifested in different behavior from the *speculation that p* or the *uncertainty whether p*. In just the same way, the fear of *bunnies* is not manifested in different behavior from the fear of *wolves*, although the *fear of bunnies* is indeed manifested in different behavior from the *enjoyment of bunnies*.

With the distinction between expression and articulation in hand, we can see that my version of the Perceptual Analysis can indeed be generalized to account for the expression of belief just as well as it accounts for the expression of emotion. Granting that we can communicate our beliefs in a variety of ways without at the same time expressing them—again, I contend that it is a mistake to assume that every time we talk about our beliefs, we thereby express them—what makes a speech act count specifically as an “expression” of a belief is its *delivery*, or how it is said. The expression of a belief, like the expression of an emotion, is the perceptual manifestation of mind.

of Berlin without thinking about it. The expression of belief, like the expression of emotion, is an expression of an occurrent mental state.

To be clear, I'm not arguing that the illocutionary force of a speech act is determined entirely by how it is said. Although assertions are often spoken one way and conjectures another, there are exceptions to this rule. It's possible for the same sentence, spoken in the same tone of voice and with the same gesture, to be an assertion in one context but a conjecture in another.³¹ What I'm arguing is that whether an assertion is an "expression" of belief, and whether a conjecture is an "expression" of speculation, depends entirely on how it is said. It's possible to communicate that one believes something, even with the force of an assertion, without at the same time *expressing* that belief. Not all assertions are expressions of belief, and not all conjectures are expressions of speculation.³² What makes a speech act an expression of a mental state is, I maintain, an accompanying tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture, which enables the perception of that mental state.

Again, some philosophers argue that assertions are always expressions of belief insofar as belief is specified in the sincerity condition of an assertion (e.g. Alston 1965, 26; Searle 1969, 65; Bach and Harnish 1979). But again, I see value in distinguishing between assertions that successfully express belief and those that don't. If I am in the middle of a laughing fit, then I may be unable to express an occurrent attitude of belief toward a proposition *p*, regardless of whether I believe *p* or not. I can assert *p*, to be sure, but my uncontrolled laughter may stand in the way of me expressing my occurrent epistemic attitude toward *p*. As I see it, we articulate or otherwise communicate our beliefs using assertions all the time, but we only sometimes express those beliefs, where to express them is to do something special,

³¹ One might also worry about the expressions of beliefs in writing and in sign language. My account of the written expression of emotion (sketched in note 27) applies to the written expression of cognitive states as well. We use a variety of techniques, within appropriate contexts, to substitute for the tones of voice and gestures that express cognitive states in speech, thereby expressing those states in writing. Similarly, although tones of voice are not typically deployed in sign language, expressive facial expressions and gestures are, and I maintain that a token sign expresses a mental state if and only if it is accompanied by an appropriate facial expression or gesture. In short, it's not *what* one signs that matters for expression, it's *how* one signs it.

³² If this claim turns out to be false, then we would have good reason to think that the expression of emotion is different, in principle, from the expression of belief (since the distinction between claiming to be in a state and expressing that state doesn't hold for the expression of belief), in which case the fifth objection would lose its grip.

namely to enable observers to perceive an occurrent state of belief or to perceive someone as being in such a state.

4. Conclusion

I've argued in this paper that the Perceptual Analysis is correct—that behaviors express emotions just in case they directly enable the perception of those emotions (either in the sense of perceiving or in the sense of perceiving-as). This analysis has overcome the strongest objections facing not only it, but also its strongest competitor, and thus I claim that it is the best analysis currently on offer. My response to the first objection supports the weaker modal claim—that emotional expressions *can* at times enable the perception of emotion. And my responses to the subsequent four objections further support the stronger conceptual claim—that emotional expressions *essentially* enable the perception of emotion.

In the course of defending this analysis, I have drawn a sharp distinction between *expressing* an emotion and *articulating* an emotion. The former is something we do with non-linguistic behavior; the latter is something we do with language. We “express” an emotion by communicating a type and intensity of emotion, namely by making that emotion perceptually manifest. We “articulate” an emotion by communicating the content of that emotion, e.g. by encoding this content in symbols. Importantly, these two modes of communication pull apart. I can express an emotion without articulating it (e.g. by snarling). And I can articulate an emotion without expressing it (e.g. by dispassionately asserting that I am angry that you broke my vase). Even when they occur together, we can distinguish the contribution of each. When I snarl, “I’m angry that you broke my vase,” my snarl expresses my anger while my words articulate it.

The Perceptual Analysis therefore gives us reason to abandon the traditional view that language is a vehicle for the expression of emotion, but it also gives us the tools we need to construct a newer, better view. This view may challenge how we think about emotion, language, and expression, but it promises to be a source of fresh insight and philosophical innovation regarding perennial questions in the philosophies of mind and language.

Bibliography

- Alston, William P. (1965) "Expressing," in *Philosophy in America*, Max Black (ed.), pp. 15-34, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Bach, Kent and Harnish, Robert. (1979) *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Banse, Rainer and Scherer, Klaus. (1996) "Acoustic Profiles in Vocal Emotional Expression," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3): 614-636.
- Bar-On, Dorit. (2004) *Speaking My Mind*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- (2010) "Expressing as 'Showing What's Within': On Mitchell Green's *Self-Expression* OUP 2007," *Philosophical Books*, 51(4): 212-227.
- Brewer, B. (2011) *Perception and Its Objects*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, Sue. (1997) *Interpreting the Personal*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Davies, Stephen. (1980) "The Expression of Emotion in Music," *Mind* 89:353 (1980): 67-86.
- Davis, Wayne. (1988) "Expression of Emotion," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 25(4): 279-291.
- (2003) *Meaning, Expression, and Thought*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- (2008) "Expressing, Meaning, Showing, and Intending to Indicate," *Intercultural Pragmatics*, 5(2): 111-129.
- Deigh, John. (1994) "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions," *Ethics*, 104(4): 824-854.
- Dretske, Fred. (1969) *Seeing and Knowing*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (2006) "Perception without Awareness," in *Perceptual Experience*, Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), pp. 147-180, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ekman, P. (1994) "All Emotions are Basic," in P. Ekman & R. Davidson (Eds.), *The Nature of Emotion*, pp. 15-19, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Ekman, Paul & Friesen, Wallace. (2003) *Unmasking the Face*, Massachusetts: Malor Books.
- Eriksson, John. (2010) "Self-Expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity," *Acta Analytica*, 25: 71-79.
- Finn, David. (1975) "Expression," *Mind*, 84(334): 192-209.
- Gallagher, Shaun & Dan Zahavi. (2012) *The Phenomenological Mind (2nd Edition)*, New York: Routledge.
- Goodman, Nelson. (1976) *Languages of Art*, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Green, Mitchell. (2007) *Self-Expression*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- (2010a) "Perceiving Emotions," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, LXXXIV: 45-61.
- (2010b) "Replies to Eriksson, Martin, and Moore," *Acta Analytica*, 25: 105-117.
- Green, O. H. (1970) "The Expression of Emotion," *Mind*, 79(316): 551-568.
- Griffiths, Paul. (1998) *What Emotions Really Are*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Hampshire, Stuart. (1976) "Feeling and Expression," in *The Philosophy of Mind*, J. Glover (ed.), pp. 73-83. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hanson, Norwood R. (1958) *Patterns of Discovery*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Izard, C. E. (1977) *Human Emotions*, New York: Plenum Press.
- Kivy, Peter. (1980) *The Corded Shell*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Koch, Phillip J. (1983) "Expressing Emotion," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64: 176-191.
- Mahmoud, Marwa and Robinson, Peter. (2011) "Interpreting Hand-Over-Face Gestures," *Affective Computing and Intelligent Interaction, Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, 6975: 248-255.
- Marchi, E., Schuller, B., Batliner, A., Fridenzon, S., Tal, S. & Golan, O. (2012) "Emotion in the Speech of Children with Autism Spectrum Conditions: Prosody and Everything Else," *WOCCI*: 17-24.
- Maynard Smith, John and Harper, David. (2004) *Animal Signals*, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Mehrabian, A. & Ferris, S.R. (1967) "Inference of Attitudes from Nonverbal Communication in Two Channels," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 31(3): 248–252.
- Mehrabian, A. & Wiener, M. (1967) "Decoding of Inconsistent Communications," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 6(1): 109–114.
- Morris, J. S., Ohman, A. and Dolan, R. J. (1999) "A Subcortical Pathway to the Right Amygdala Mediating 'Unseen' Fear," *PNAS*, 96: 1680-1685.
- Newen, A., Welpinghus, A. and Juckel, G. (2015) "Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception," *Mind and Language*, 30(2): 187-208.
- Orlandi, N. (2011) "The Innocent Eye: Seeing-as Without Concepts," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 48(1): 17-31.
- Overgaard, Søren. (2006) "Rethinking Other Minds: Wittgenstein and Levinas on Expression," *Inquiry*, 48(3): 249-274.
- Panskepp, Jaak. (2000) "Emotions as Natural Kinds within the Mammalian Brain," in *Handbook of Emotions* (2nd ed.), M. Lewis & J. Haviland-Jones (eds.), pp. 137-156, New York: Guilford Press.
- Prinz, Jesse. (2004) *Gut Reactions*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reddy, V. (2008) *How Infants Know Minds*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Russell, J. (2003) "Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion," *Psychological Review*, 110(1): 145-172.
- Scheler, Max. (1970) *The Nature of Sympathy*, London: Archon Books.
- Scherer, K. (2009) "The Dynamic Architecture of Emotion: Evidence for the Component Process Model," *Cognition & Emotion*, 23(7): 1307-1351.
- Scherer, K. (2005) "What are Emotions? And How Can They Be Measured?" *Social Science Information*, 44(4): 695-729.
- Searle, John. (2015) *Seeing Things as They Are*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- (1969) *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Sellars, Wilfrid. (1969) "Language as Thought and as Communication," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 29(4): 506-527

- Smith, Joel. (2015) "The Phenomenology of Face-to-Face Mindreading," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 90(2): 274-293.
- Stout, Rowland. (2010) "Seeing the Anger in Someone's Face," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, LXXXIV: 29-43.
- Taylor, Charles. (1979) "Action as Expression," in *Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichmann (eds.), pp. 73-89, Brighton: Harvester Books.
- Tomkins, S. (1962) *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Vol. 1*, New York: Springer.
- Tormey, Alan. (1971) *The Concept of Expression*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1980) *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (2006) *Philosophical Investigations*, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.
- Wollheim, Richard. (1968) "Expression," in *Human Agent, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1966-67*, G. N. A. Vesey (ed.), pp. 227-244, New York: Macmillan; St Martin's Press.
- Yigit, O. T. (2005) "Emoticon Usage in Task-Oriented and Socio-Emotional Contexts in Online Discussion Board," M.S. thesis, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL.
- Zahavi, Dan. (2007) "Expression and Empathy," in *Folk Psychology Re-Assessed*, Hutto and Ratcliffe (eds.), pp. 25-40, New York: Springer.