

Please cite the published version in *The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds*, D. Gatzia & B. Brogaard (eds.), available via Routledge at <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429030246>.

To Express or Not to Express? Ambivalence about Emotional Expression

Trip Glazer

Introduction

Your friend watches in eager anticipation as you open your birthday present. To your dismay, the gift inside is tacky and tasteless. You cannot help but feel disappointed. Part of you wants to express your disappointment, but another part of you wants to suppress it. The first part believes that friends should be honest with one another, but the second part hates the idea of upsetting your friend with the truth. You must make up your mind quickly, and so you do, but you later regret your decision. You wish that you had reacted differently.

In this example you are wrestling with a familiar feeling, *ambivalence about emotional expression*—the simultaneous desire to express and to suppress an emotion. This feeling may seem inescapable. As emotional creatures, we want to express our emotions. But as social creatures, we want to abide by social norms, which often call for the suppression of emotion. Thus, our emotions often throw us onto the horns of a dilemma—to express or not to express?

My aim in this chapter is to examine two cultural perspectives on ambivalence about emotional expression. For much of the twentieth century, Americans believed that emotions are disruptive, and thus that people should resolve their ambivalence by suppressing their emotions. *Don't get bent out of shape; keep your cool!* But in the past few decades, there has been a push toward resolving the ambivalence in the other direction, toward authentic self-expression. *Don't bottle up your feelings; express yourself!*

I find that both perspectives frame the choice between expression and suppression in an unsatisfactory manner. Both construe it as a conflict

between the self and society—between individual needs and the public good. They differ based on whether they value authentic self-expression or social cooperation more. I offer an alternative analysis. If we instead view the choice between expression and suppression as a conflict between instant and delayed gratification, then we find that the suppression of emotion often functions as an honest signal of self-control. By holding my emotions in check, I demonstrate that I can resist the urge to express my feelings for the sake of pursuing a longer-term goal. *I am angry, yes, but I won't let this anger get the best of me!* If we are suppressing our emotions to reveal our reflectively endorsed values, then suppression, ironically, can be an act of authentic self-expression. Suppression puts the deep self on display, when expression reveals only the superficial self. Thus, as a signal of self-control, suppression can be an act of authentic self-expression *and* a prosocial display.

Ambivalence and Its Discontents

To express or not to express? This question assumes an ambivalence about emotional expression (or “ambivalence” for short): I *want* to express my feelings, but at the same time I *don't want* to. More often than not, this ambivalence results from a conflict between emotions and social norms. In what follows, I discuss this conflict and its consequences.

Emotions normally consist of three components: thoughts, feelings, and actions. A hiker who crosses paths with a bear in the woods will immediately think the bear is dangerous, experience a sinking feeling in the pit of her stomach, and freeze up. Philosophers of emotion tend to focus on the first two components: the thoughts and feelings that are characteristic of different emotions. But the third component is also important. According to Andrea Scarantino (2014), every emotion is characterized by a distinct set of emotional actions. These actions range from the involuntarily (increased heartrate, goosebumps, facial expressions) to the impulsive (recoiling in fear, striking in anger) to the planned (finding a place to hide in fear, plotting one's revenge in anger). Scarantino identifies emotions with *action tendencies*, or dispositions to act that take precedence over other dispositions and that prepare the agent to undertake the disposed actions. Fear, for instance, prepares the agent to engage in various avoidance behaviors and prioritizes these behaviors over others, which may interfere with the goal of escaping danger.

Not all emotional actions are emotional expressions. To be an emotional *expression*, an emotional action must occur for the sake of communicating the emotion to observers (Bar-On 2004, 266-269; Green 2007, 26-27). Thus, although fear is characterized by tendencies toward shrieking and fleeing, only the shriek is a proper expression of fear, since only the shriek occurs for the sake of communicating fear. Fleeing, by contrast, occurs for the sake of evading danger. Another way to put the point is that some emotional actions serve the function of *expressing* an emotion while other emotional actions serve the function of *coping with* an emotion (Koch 1983). Every emotion is characterized by tendencies toward both (Shariff & Tracy 2012).

The takeaway point is that emotions are characterized by motivations toward expression (among other actions). The feeling of fear is, in part, an impulse toward performing characteristic expressions of fear. In general, you cannot feel fear without wanting to express your fear in some way. The motivation toward expression is built into the emotion itself.

Embivalence arises when this natural motivation toward expression is countered by a separate motivation toward suppression. (To be clear, a “suppressed” emotion is one that is felt but not expressed.) This motivation toward suppression is often generated by social norms. Very roughly, social norms are “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done” (Sunstein 1996, 914). Social norms influence people’s behavior by imposing “taxes” and “subsidies” on different actions (Sunstein 1996, 910). Although I might benefit from lying in a particular situation, the norm against lying imposes a tax on this behavior, which ideally outweighs the benefit I hoped to gain from it. Thus, “[t]he costs and benefits of action, from the standpoint of individual agents, include the consequences of acting inconsistently with social norms (Sunstein 1996, 909).

All societies enforce norms of expression—norms dictating which emotions can be expressed when. Following historians Carol and Peter Stearns, we may call a society’s norms of expression its “emotionology” (Stearns & Stearns 1985, 813). The emotionology of the Inuit, for instance, contains a strict prohibition on expressions of anger. Any child over the age of three who expresses anger is at first ignored and then, should the child persist, ridiculed (Briggs 1970). The goal is to raise children into adults who always smile and who never impose their anger on anyone. Contemporary U.S. Americans have different attitudes toward anger, and the Stearnses offer a history of this emotionology in their book, *Anger* (1986). The American emotionology of anger is based on the idea of “anger management.” Like the

Inuit, Americans believe that anger is dangerous. But unlike the Inuit, Americans believe that anger is natural and should be channeled into productive activities rather than expressed impulsively.

To recap, anger generates a motivation toward expressing anger, while social norms generate a motivation toward suppressing anger. The result is an ambivalence about expressing anger: I *want* to express anger, but at the same time I *don't want* to.

King and Emmons (1990) developed a questionnaire to measure ambivalence. The questionnaire (abbreviated as AEQ) presents subjects with a series of items, and asks them to rate each from 1 (the subject never experiences the item in question) to 5 (the subject often experiences the item in question). Examples of items include:

1. I want to express my emotions honestly but I am afraid that it may cause me embarrassment or hurt.
2. I strive to keep a smile on my face in order to convince others I am happier than I really am.
3. I worry that if I express negative emotions such as fear and anger, other people will not approve of me.
4. I would like to express my disappointment when things don't go as well as planned, but I don't want to appear vulnerable.
5. I try to suppress my anger, but I would like other people to know how I feel. (King & Emmons 1990, 868)

Using AEQ, a number of studies investigate the long- and short-term consequences of persistent feelings of ambivalence. Albani et al. (2007) find that a high score on AEQ is predictive of depression and reduced psychological wellbeing. Jerg-Bretzke et al. (2013) find that deployed soldiers who scored high on AEQ were more likely to suffer PTSD following trauma. King and Emmons (1990) find that while expressiveness is positively correlated with wellbeing, ambivalence is negatively correlated with wellbeing.

Turning to short-term effects, Heisel and Mongrain (2004) find that conflicts between romantic partners who score high on AEQ result in higher levels of anxiety and dissatisfaction than do conflicts between romantic partners who score low on AEQ. Relatedly, King (1998) finds that those who score high on AEQ but low on a measure of emotional expressiveness more often misread facial expressions, leading to interpersonal conflicts. And

Rothman (2011) finds that individuals who reveal their ambivalence in competitive settings are more likely to be taken advantage of by others.¹

These studies suggest that ambivalence is maladaptive. It is not only unpleasant to be pulled in two directions, but potentially damaging. How can we avoid this ambivalence? We would not get very far attempting to eliminate the motivation toward expression, given that it is built into our emotional circuitry. A more promising route would be to eliminate the motivation toward suppression by changing social norms. Sunstein notes that “Existing social conditions are often more fragile than might be supposed, because they depend on social norms to which...people may not have much allegiance” (Sunstein 1996, 909).

The twentieth century was an age of emotional restraint. The ideal of suppressing one’s emotions, of keeping one’s cool, prevailed, despite the negative impact that this ideal had on people’s lives. In the past few decades, however, cultural attitudes have shifted. People are beginning to abandon the ideal of emotional restraint and embrace an ideal of authentic self-expression. *Don’t bottle up your feelings; express yourself!* With less pressure to suppress their emotions, people will presumably experience less ambivalence, and ideally suffer fewer of the negative outcomes associated with ambivalence. The culture of emotional restraint is fragile insofar as it depends on norms of suppression to which people have little allegiance.

The Rise and Fall of Emotional Restraint

In the preceding section I presented a triumphalist narrative about authentic self-expression. The age of emotional restraint was bad, but thankfully we are progressing into an enlightened age of authentic self-expression. To scrutinize this cultural shift more closely, I want to reflect on two historical questions. First, why did norms of emotional restraint rise to prominence in the first place? Second, why did people’s allegiance to these norms begin to falter? The answers to these questions will give us insight into the social function of emotion suppression.

Carol and Peter Stearns have traced the rise of emotional restraint in the U.S. (Stearns & Stearns 1985; Stearns & Stearns 1986; Stearns 1993; Stearns 1994). Their story begins in the nineteenth century, when people spoke more

¹ Scholars in the humanities are even more critical of ambivalence. Joseph Pleck (1995) argues that ambivalence promotes violence while Sara Ahmed (2010) suggests that it helps to preserve patriarchy, white supremacy, and heteronormativity.

of “passions” than of “emotions.” As the word suggests, “passions” are intense and profound feelings, especially of love and loss. People didn’t think of themselves as controlling their passions; they thought of their passions as controlling them. The arts flourished as members of the growing middle class sought the experience of being “swept up in” and “moved by” literature, music, and theater. The character of Heathcliff in Emily Brontë’s *Wuthering Heights* (1847) exemplifies the nineteenth century view that the passions bring out the very best and the very worst in people. Peter Stearns writes that “Victorian emotional culture recognized intense feelings as a source both of danger and of energies that would enable men and women to fulfill their social responsibilities” (Stearns 1993, 37). Although Heathcliff’s passions ultimately destroyed him, he is less of a tragic figure than Herman Melville’s *Bartleby* (1853), whose utter lack of passion resulted in an inability to carry out his work, which resulted in his eventual demise.²

Because it was the passions that controlled people, and not the other way around, quarantine was a common method of emotion regulation. Relationship manuals advised that angry spouses should separate, sleeping off their anger before reconciling the next morning. Parenting guides recommended that upset children should be placed in “time out” until their emotions subsided (Stearns & Stearns 1986, 58). Interestingly, the passions were largely unregulated in the workplace. Men could vent their anger on the farm or in the factory, and they generally found the freedom to do so. Peter Stearns notes that “Nineteenth-century work rules...concentrated on behavior, not mood, and there was no explicit discussion of anger as a labor issue” (Stearns 1994, 121).³ The passions were seen as a threat to domesticity, but not as a threat to productivity.

These attitudes began to change in the early twentieth century. Talk of “passions” gave way to talk of “emotions,” and the focus shifted from intense outpourings of emotion to the steady emotional undercurrents of daily life. Importantly, emotion came to be seen as a threat to economic productivity. Changes to the American economy resulted in increasing numbers of workers leaving the farm and factory to work in the office or on the sales floor (Stearns 1994, 214-215). In these new workplaces, emotions were seen as disruptive. A salesperson who expressed frustration toward a customer lost a sale. An office worker who expressed anger toward a co-worker turned a friendly

² See Huebner & Glazer (2016) for an analysis of *Bartleby*’s emotions.

³ The exception was anger directed toward management that threatened to foment into protest or demonstration (Stearns 1994, 121).

collaborative environment into a hostile competitive environment. Peter Stearns writes:

Attacks on anger, particularly in middle management, readily suggested wider concerns about emotions in the workplace. Rationality became central to the new personnel litany: “Effectiveness decreases as emotionality increases.” Grievances, particularly, must be approached in low-key passion, “with as little heat as possible.” And the word “cool” began to creep in as a talisman of desirable emotional control. “It is of the utmost importance that the foreman remain cool,” as a 1943 personnel relations article put it. (Stearns 1994, 124-125)

Doncaster Humm, a statistician, and Guy Wadsworth, a clinical psychologist, became early experts of the threat posed by emotion in the workplace, arguing that emotional friction between employees was far and above the leading cause of poor work performance (Humm & Wadsworth 1942). Due in no small part to their research, companies began establishing “human resources” departments, tasked with formulating and enforcing norms of emotional restraint (Stearns & Stearns 1986, 116).

By midcentury, the middle-class American ideal was to perform “mental labor” in a salaried “white collar” job as opposed to performing “manual labor” in a waged “blue collar” job (Mills 1951). Job ads and hiring procedures for white collar jobs emphasized a new skill set, “personal skills,” which included the ability to manage emotions in real time. Slowly but steadily, the ideal of emotional restraint—the image of the cool and composed white collar worker, who served as an emotional role model for the rest of his family—was established.

Having answered the first historical question (how did the ideal of emotional restraint rise to prominence?), I turn now to the second (why did this ideal begin to lose adherents?). The sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1983) argues that in the age of employer-mandated emotional restraint, authentic self-expression emerged as a class privilege. In the new corporate landscape, junior staff and middle-management were paid to remain cool, calm, and collected. Executives, by contrast, were free to vent their emotions as they saw fit. The image of the aggressive, frazzled executive, who “goes ballistic” when his expectations are not met, emerged in tandem with the image of the emotionally restrained worker (Stearns 1994, 267-268). Think of how eagerly academics flout common workplace norms. They dress casually, they speak with profanity, and they make no attempts to hide their

political views. These behaviors are class markers to the extent that most wage- and salary-earners are not permitted to engage in them. In the same way, the act of authentic self-expression emerged as a way of signaling one's freedom from the sort of work that demanded the suppression of emotion.

Hochschild's analysis reveals that the ideal of emotional restraint began to lose adherents as soon as it was established. The emotional style that marked entry into the middle-class was eagerly shunned by members of the upper-class, resulting in a middle-class desire to cast off the shackles of emotional restraints as soon as they had been fastened. Hochschild's analysis also tempers, to an extent, the triumphalist narrative of authentic self-expression. The freedom to express one's emotions, whatever they may be, is a class privilege. Given the negative outcomes associated with ambivalence, this freedom from norms of suppression is a class privilege with significant psychological and social advantages.⁴ The question of who benefits from an ideal of authentic self-expression should not be ignored.

The Social Function of Emotion Suppression

In the last section we learned that the culture of cool enforced norms of emotional restraint for a reason. It was believed that *emotions disrupt cooperation*, and thus that *the suppression of emotion facilitates cooperation*. To counter the natural motivation toward expression that emotions generate, workplaces instituted and enforced norms of suppression. The resulting ambivalence may have been bad for employees' health, but it was good for business.

Emotions, we saw earlier, are characterized by action tendencies (Scarantino 2014). Negative emotions are often characterized by *antisocial* action tendencies (van Kleef 2016). Grief motivates withdrawal, anger motivates domination, and contempt motivates exclusion. None of these behaviors is conducive to cooperation. And because emotional expressions are signals of social predispositions (van Kleef 2016, 27), observers who see expressions of grief, anger, and contempt may assume that the emoter will become uncooperative, and so may themselves become uncooperative in anticipation.

⁴ Glazer (2019) argues that emotional laborers are subject to a special kind of epistemic injustice, called "emotional misperception."

Imagine that a saleswoman is helping a customer to select a new smartphone. The customer can't make up his mind about what he wants, and the saleswoman begins to become frustrated. Frustration is characterized by tendencies toward impatience, emotional distancing, and aggressiveness. The more frustrated the saleswoman becomes, the less she will want to help the customer. If she expresses her frustration openly, then the customer will detect her fleeting willingness to assist him, and he may decide to walk out on the sale. Everyone loses. This is a clear case in which a negative emotion undermines a mutually beneficial transaction. However, if the saleswoman can suppress her frustration, then she can help the customer to find a new phone that he likes. Everyone wins! The point of "service with a smile," then, is to prevent negative emotions from disrupting cooperation. With emotions held in check, one can maintain positive, friendly relations with others and enjoy the fruits of mutually beneficial cooperation.

We find traces of this idea in the history of philosophy. Hobbes (1651/1994) claims that some passions incline men to war while other passions incline men to peace. Social harmony requires the suppression of the competitive passions and the cultivation of the cooperative passions (Schmitter 2010). Similarly, Hume (1975, 3.3.2.10) argues that by suppressing negative emotions we can "prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive." Finally, Schopenhauer (1851/2000, II.31.396) likens society to a prickle of porcupines in the winter, who attempt to huddle close enough to one other to share their warmth, but not so close that they prick each other with their spines. Human emotions are like spines. Our frustrations, jealousies, joys, and griefs will at times prick those around us, and so by suppressing these emotions—by retracting our spines—we can more comfortably coexist.

Suppression, on the view under consideration, has social utility. It may be unpleasant to experience ambivalence, and too much of it may be unhealthy, but a little bit of ambivalence can go a long way toward facilitating cooperation. Suppression is a "social lubricant," which reduces emotional friction. By holding our frustrations, disappointments, irritations, and disdain in check, we can more easily get along and cooperate. As long as it is felt in moderation, ambivalence may do more good than bad.

The claim that emotional restraint is a social lubricant rests on two assumptions: first, that emotions are indeed disruptive; and second, that hiding an emotion mitigates its disruptiveness. These assumptions are intuitive, but can they hold up under critical scrutiny?

In the age of emotional restraint, it was widely accepted that emotions are disruptive. But now that we are entering an age of authentic self-expression, this assumption no longer seems so obvious. With increasing frequency, scholars and scientists argue that emotions, even negative emotions, can promote cooperation within groups. Did norms of suppression arise because emotions are disruptive (the age of emotional restraint's view)? Or do we assume that emotions are disruptive because we live in a culture that historically frowned upon emotional expression (the age of authentic self-expression's view)? Consider two arguments.

In "The Uses of Anger" (1981/1997), Audre Lorde discusses the anger that she feels in response to the racism of white feminists. Although white feminists have told her that she should suppress her anger, lest it interfere with their shared feminist projects, Lorde argues that the expression of her anger is good for the movement. She writes: "It is not the anger of other women that will destroy us, but our refusals to stand still, to listen to its rhythms, to learn within it, to move beyond the manner of presentation to the substance, to tap that anger as an important source of empowerment" (1981/1997, 282). We see in Lorde's writing a return of the Victorian idea of emotional vigor. Emotions can be dangerous, yes, but they can also be productive by highlighting injustices and by energizing women to join together in a truly common cause. Lorde's claim is that the expression of anger may be better for cooperation among feminists than the suppression of it. The suppression of anger enables subordination, not cooperation.

In the same vein, Gerben van Kleef summarizes a decade of empirical research into the social dynamics of emotion with the assertion that "the functionality of a particular emotional display [depends] on the degree to which it helps to remedy a current problem within the group (2016, 120). Granted, there are contexts in which displays of anger create more problems than they remedy. But there are other contexts in which displays of anger are mutually beneficial. "When the task requires careful planning, analytical information processing, and critical evaluation of ideas, groups may be better off when they develop a (mildly) negative affective tone" (van Kleef 2016, 121). Similarly, "when a group's capacity to [make] decisions is hampered by a power vacuum or a lack of role clarity, differential displays of high-status (e.g., anger, pride) versus low-status (e.g., embarrassment, guilt) emotions by different group members may facilitate coordination by instilling a rudimentary sense of hierarchy that may serve as a heuristic solution to decision making" (van Kleef 2016, 120). Negative emotions, then, are not always disruptive. They can at times be beneficial to

cooperation and group cohesion. The HR mantra, “Effectiveness decreases as emotionality increases” (Stearns 1994, 124), is not generally true. It is true only sometimes. Often it is false.

The second assumption underlying the social lubricant view is that hiding an emotion can mitigate its disruptiveness. A frustrated saleswoman may not feel an inner motivation to help the customer, but as long as the customer doesn’t know that she is frustrated, the interaction may proceed on good terms. Thus, suppression is conceived primarily as an act of benevolent deception. I don’t want you to know what I am feeling, since this knowledge may make you less cooperative, which will be bad for both of us. Thus, the deception needn’t be malicious; I hide *my* emotion with the intention of benefiting *us*.

The problem with attempting to deceive people is that, if detected, deception undermines trust. Van Kleef finds that when customers think that a salesperson’s display of emotion is authentic, their satisfaction increases. But when customers think that a salesperson’s display of emotion is inauthentic, their satisfaction plummets (van Kleef 2016, 151). He writes,

Inauthentic emotional expressions may be perceived as dishonest or manipulative influence attempts... The perceived inappropriateness of such influence tactics may inspire negative affective reactions in customers that may lead them to turn against the service employee and/or the company that they represented. (Van Kleef 2016, 152)

Suppression can promote cooperation, but only if the ruse is successful. If the ruse is unsuccessful, then suppression may backfire. Rather than promoting cooperation, the attempt to hide one’s emotions can result in acrimony.

Because suppression is a risky strategy, many workplaces recommend the *elimination* of emotion rather than its *suppression*. A “suppressed” emotion is felt but not expressed. An “eliminated” emotion is no longer felt. Enraged, a person can close her eyes and count to ten in an attempt to extinguish her anger. Saddened, a person can watch silly videos to overcome his sadness. Suppression gets rid of the expression but not the feeling; elimination gets rid of the feeling and hence the expression.⁵ In *The Managed Heart* (1983), Arlie

⁵ Both suppression and elimination are examples of what psychologists call “emotion regulation,” or “the processes by which we influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them” (Gross & Barrett 2011, 8).

Hochschild coins the term “emotional labor” to denote the effort that workers in service industry go to in order to emote in accordance with workplace norms. She distinguishes between two methods of emotional labor. A worker engages in “surface acting” by suppressing negative emotions and in “deep acting” by eliminating them. Surface acting changes one’s expressions but not one’s feelings. Deep acting changes one’s expression *by* changing one’s feelings.

Increasingly, scholars and scientists find that surface acting is less effective than deep acting at achieving desired workplace outcomes (van Kleef 2016, 151-152). Furthermore, surface acting is associated with worse psychological outcomes for the emotional laborer (Kim & Choo 2017; Jeung, Kim, & Chang 2018). Whatever social value suppression promises, elimination offers more of this value and at a lower cost. The way to effectively promote cooperation is not by suppressing disruptive emotions, but by eliminating disruptive emotions, which also eliminates the feeling of ambivalence. By getting rid of the emotion, one also gets rid of the motivation toward expression.

We’ve seen that both assumptions underlying the social lubricant view—that emotions are bad and that hiding emotions is good—face serious objections. Perhaps the triumphalist narrative about authentic self-expression is right. Not only is ambivalence associated with a plethora of negative health outcomes, but suppression isn’t even that effective at promoting cooperation in the first place. Is there no place for ambivalence in an age of authentic self-expression?

According to the psychologist James Gross and colleagues (Suri & Gross 2016, 457-459), we may distinguish among three ways in which we manage our emotions. *Attentional deployment* involves the intentional refocusing of attention in order to change what we feel. To avoid feeling fear in a creepy situation, one may hum a song to create a distraction. *Cognitive change* involves the intentional reappraisal of a situation in order to elicit a different emotion. When your dog defecates on the carpet, you can turn irritation into sympathy by imagining that your dog really wanted to hold it, but couldn’t quite manage it. Finally *response modulation* involves the intentional control over one’s outward expression. Research confirms that all three methods are generally successful in managing emotions in real time (Webb et al. 2012). Attentional deployment and cognitive change can be used for the elimination of emotion, while response modulation can be used for the suppression of emotion.

A New Function for Suppression

I propose a new function for suppression. Suppression is not always an attempt to hide one's emotions; suppression can also be a *signal of self-control*. By holding my emotions in check, I demonstrate that I can delay gratification for the sake of adhering to shared norms of conduct. My emotions generate a natural motivation toward expression, and it is instantly gratifying to act on this motivation. Yet by resisting the temptation, by refusing to scratch my emotional itch, I show you that I am in control of my impulses. I show you that when norms and impulses conflict, I will follow the norms. As a result, suppression builds trust and encourages cooperation.

Imagine that you are waiting in line to order coffee at a coffee shop. The line is long, and you can tell that the baristas are becoming frazzled. Your turn finally comes, and the barista greets you with a friendly smile and asks, "How may I help you?" You would be naïve to think that the barista is actually happy to see you and eager to take your order. You know that the barista is frazzled. You know that he would rather be sitting at home on the couch. The barista isn't smiling to trick you into thinking that he's feeling something that he's not. Rather, he's smiling to show you that *even though* he is frazzled and would rather be sitting on the couch, he is committed to doing his job and to doing it well. The smile reassures you that your interaction with the barista is going to be pleasant and painless, and as a result you are happy to leave him a generous tip. Everyone wins!

As a signal of self-control, suppression is not an act of deception. The barista is not hiding his emotions from me; rather, he is showing me that he can resist the motivation to express his emotions. The suppression of emotion is overt—he wants me to recognize that he is suppressing his emotion. Similarly, this view does not assume that emotions are bad. The barista is not suppressing an emotion because that emotion is disruptive; rather, the barista is suppressing his emotion to show me that he can delay gratification—that he is self-controlled. Most importantly, emotional restraint is, on this view, an act of authentic self-expression. The suppression of emotion puts the deep self on display—it reveals that the barista doesn't want to want to express his emotion (Wolf 1993; Frankfurt 1971). Expression, in this case, would put only the superficial self on display—it would reveal only that he wants to express his emotion, not that he doesn't want to want to express his emotion.

I develop the view that suppression signals self-control in three parts. First, I show that social and economic changes in twentieth century America

created a new challenge for cooperation, which called for demonstrations of self-control. Second, I show that suppression answers this call by signaling self-control. And third, I show that suppression is especially well-suited to demonstrating self-control.

Social Capital and Self-Control

We saw earlier that the ideal of emotional restraint arose in response to broad social and economic changes that moved workers from the farm and factory to the office and sales floor. As the political scientist Robert Putnam (2000) points out, these broad changes also resulted in a steady decline of social capital, or the networks of relationships and the shared identities that bind members of a community together. People started going to church less. They stopped joining civic groups. They were more likely to live alone or with several immediate family members than with a large extended family. More people were bowling than ever before, but they were bowling alone. Jonathan Haidt (2013, 336-343) adds that the ability of a society to enforce its norms weakens as social capital decreases. In a community with high social capital, everyone is concerned with everyone's behavior, and norm deviance is quickly and reliably corrected. But in a community with low social capital, a philosophy of live and let live prevails, and norm deviance is less quickly and less reliably corrected.

As the "taxes" and "subsidies" associated with violating and following norms become less certain and less immediate, the choice between norm violation and norm conformity becomes a choice between a small but immediate and certain gratification (norm violation) and a large but delayed and uncertain gratification (norm conformity). But this means that the "taxes" and "subsidies" are only motivating to those who are able to delay gratification. The impulsive are as immune to the promise of a distant, uncertain reward as they are to the threat of a distant, uncertain punishment. As social capital declines, norms lose their grip on those who cannot delay gratification.

In support of this claim, the criminologists Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi (1990) find that the greatest predictor of norm deviance is the lack of self-control. Most deviant behavior is impulsive and immediately gratifying. Most deviant behavior has few, if any, long-term benefits. Meta-analyses of empirical studies confirm that measures of impulsivity track measures of deviance (Tittle et al. 2003; Vazsonyi et al. 2017). Less self-control results in more deviance. More self-control results in less deviance.

Similarly, Hanna Pickard (2018) argues that addiction is an impairment of agency characterized by myopic decision making. When weighing their options, addicts tend to favor small, short-term benefits over large, long-term benefits. Because of this, addicts tend not to be motivated by traditional social sanctions, whose consequences are too distant or too uncertain to feel pressing. The threat of losing one's job or going to prison are easily outweighed by the instant gratification provided by the next high. The problem, in other words, is that norms have lost their grip on the myopic addict. With declining social capital, social "taxes" and "subsidies" only matter to the self-controlled—to those playing the long game.

The decline in social capital created a demand for self-control. If the impulsive are less likely to respect shared norms of conduct, then, all else being equal, we would feel more comfortable cooperating with people who are self-controlled. Such people are more likely to respect social norms, and thus are more predictable in their behavior (Zawidzki 2013). You can count on them to follow through on their commitments because you know that they are motivated to do so. It would be useful, then, to be able to tell, at a glance, who is self-controlled and who is impulsive.

I argue that suppression serves this very function: suppression signals self-control. It is no coincidence, then, that the decline in social capital ushered in an age of emotional restraint. Employers noticed that emotional restraint increased productivity, but they failed to understand why. They thought that it had something to do with emotions disrupting cooperation. In fact, it had everything to do with the increased importance of self-control.

Signaling Self-Control

Suppression can serve as a signal of self-control. By showing you my ability to delay gratification, I show you that I am motivated to abide by social norms. This display encourages your trust, and enables us to benefit from cooperation.

I begin with a few definitions. A *signal* is an action or trait that occurs for the sake of communicating something, whether honestly or dishonestly (Green 2007, 5). Noxious tiger moths click to warn potential predators that they are poisonous. Edible pyralid moths click to deceive potential predators into thinking that they are poisonous. The tiger moth's click is an honest signal. The pyralid moth's click is a dishonest signal. Both convey the message, "I'm poisonous!"

A *reliable signal* is a signal that it difficult to produce dishonestly (Green 2007, 6). Toads signal their size by croaking. Larger toads have longer and thicker vocal cords, resulting in deeper croaks. Smaller toads have shorter and thinner vocal cords, resulting in higher-pitched croaks. Deep croaks are reliable signals of size insofar as smaller toads are physiologically incapable of producing them (Frank 1988, 96).

One type of reliable signal is a *costly signal*, or a signal whose costliness makes it difficult to produce dishonestly (Green 2007, 6). Think of Thorstein Veblen's (1899/1994) account of conspicuous consumption. A fancy sports car is a costly signal of wealth. It is reliable because it is expensive. A poor man can't trick others into thinking that he's wealthy by driving around town in a fancy sports car, for the simple reason that he can't afford one. Only the wealthy can afford fancy sports cars, so fancy sports cars are reliable signals of wealth.

We normally think of suppression as the absence of a signal—as the attempt to prevent an expression from signaling an emotion. But suppression can be a signal in its own right. Studies find that observers are reliable in distinguishing between genuine and posed facial expressions (Dawel et al. 2016; Namba et al. 2018). When you see the barista smile at you, you know that the smile is posed. Furthermore, you know that the smile is masking suppressed negative emotions. If suppression is an attempt to deceive observers, then it is rarely successful. Suppressed anger looks different from no anger. Suppressed sadness looks different from no sadness. More often than not, the act of suppression is unambiguous. Observers know it when they see it.

When suppression is overt, it can be a costly signal of self-control. Just as the wealthy signal their wealth by spending it on things that have little utility beyond signaling wealth, so too does suppression signal self-control by exercising it for no other reason than to show that one has it. You know that my emotion is generating a motivation toward expression, but you can see that I am willfully resisting this urge. Furthermore, because the motivation toward suppression is generated by social norms, you can see that I am willfully resisting the urge to express my emotions for the sake of abiding by shared norms of conduct. Thus, suppression signals my commitment to adhering to norms, even when my feelings and desires pull me in another direction. A person who is impulsive, who lacks the ability to delay gratification, may have difficulty producing costly signals of self-control. Only the wealthy can afford fancy sports cars. Only the self-controlled can suppress strong emotions.

Because the modern workplace is characterized by conditions that impair self-control (stress, anxiety, burnout, depression), the suppression of emotion demonstrates self-control in the most opportune moments: when it cannot be taken for granted. We are comforted by such demonstrations, because they indicate that norms have a grip on the suppressor—that she cares about the long-term “taxes” incurred from norm violations and the long-term “subsidies” earned from norm conformity. All else being equal, we’d prefer to interact with those who are committed to following shared norms of conduct than those who are not, and thus we place a high premium on reliable signals of self-control.

Why Suppression?

On the view that I am developing, the point of suppression is not to prevent emotions from disrupting social interactions, but rather to signal self-control. Thus, in a sense, emotions are beside the point. It is self-control, not emotionality, that is at issue. But if *any* overt display of self-control can be a demonstration of the capacity for self-control, then what makes the suppression of emotion special? Why signal self-control in this way rather than in some other way? My goal in this subsection is to explain why suppression became the *lingua franca* of self-control. The basic idea is that because the human face provides ongoing, up-to-date information about a person’s emotions, the suppression of facial expressions provides ongoing, up-to-date information about a person’s self-control.

Sir Charles Bell, the 19th century anatomist and creationist, cites the expressiveness of the human face as evidence of design. Indeed, the face seems perfectly suited to putting the heart on display. Feelings of joy stretch the face into a smile. Feelings of sadness screw the face into a pout. And feelings of anger pull the face into a frown. In looking at the movements of the face, observers can know the stirrings of the heart. Bell describes facial expressions as “characteristic signs provided by nature for the express purpose of intimating the inward emotions: that they may be interpreted by a peculiar and intuitive faculty in the observer” (Bell 1844, 120).

Impressed by Bell’s observations, Charles Darwin writes *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872) to show that a naturalistic explanation of the expressiveness of the human face, consistent with his theory of evolution by natural selection, is possible. Although Darwin disagrees with Bell about the origins of facial expressions, he agrees with Bell about their current function: they express emotions. Smiles express joy.

Pouts express sadness. Frowns express anger. Darwin writes in the conclusion of *Expression* that:

The movements of expression in the face and body, whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare. They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns disapproval. We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expressions; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strengthened. The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified. (Darwin 1872/2009, 359)

Expressing, for Darwin as for Bell, is a three-place relation. A *subject* expresses *an emotion* to *an audience*. Expressing isn't mere venting or expelling. Expressing is the distinctive way in which faces communicate emotions to curious onlookers. Facial expressions are signals: they convey information about emotions, and they occur for the sake of conveying this information (Green 2007, 26-27; Copenhagen & Odenbaugh 2019).

Many contemporary psychologists agree that six basic emotions are universally expressed and recognized in faces: joy, anger, sadness, fear, surprise, and disgust (Ekman 2016). Two studies stand out. First, Matsumoto and Willingham (2009) found that congenitally blind and sighted athletes from twenty-three countries produced the same facial expressions after winning or losing matches, suggesting that these facial expressions are not learned. Second, Ekman, Friesen, and colleagues (1987) found that subjects from ten countries, spanning the globe, agreed in their categorizations of facial expressions of the six basic emotions. In most cases, the agreement exceeded 90%.

These studies suggest a biological basis for the production and perception of six facial expressions of emotion. Smiles, pouts, frowns, gawks, gapes, and sneers are universal signals of joy, sadness, anger, surprise, fear, and disgust. The face provides a steady stream of information about a person's predispositions, which transcends linguistic and cultural boundaries. Thus, the face is an especially important source of social information in more diverse societies, like the U.S.

Rychlowska, Miyamoto, and Mutsumoto, et al. (2015) investigated why some societies (like the U.S.) encourage smiling at strangers while others (like Finland) do not. They found that norms of smiling track historical diversity. Countries with a history of immigration from many different source countries tend to encourage smiling. Countries without a history of diverse immigration tend not to. Rychlowska, Miyamoto, and Mutsumoto, et al. (2015) hypothesize that when people regularly interact with others who do not share their native language or culture, facial expressions of emotion play a more central role in communication. Words get lost in translation; faces do not.

Because Americans attend so closely to the expressions of the face, the suppression of facial expressions of emotion is an especially easy and reliable means of demonstrating self-control. When the frazzled barista greets me with a smile, I can see immediately that he is suppressing his emotions. I know that although he wants to twist his face into a frown, he is resisting the temptation. This act of self-control tells me that although he would rather be relaxing at home on the couch, he is willing and able to delay gratification for the sake of doing his job and doing it well. The barista is not hiding his feelings from me; he is demonstrating his capacity for self-control. The demonstration of self-control reassures me, because I know that I can count on him to act in accordance with shared norms of conduct, and not simply in accordance with his impulses.

In sum, suppression has become the *lingua franca* of self-control because the face provides ongoing, up-to-date information about one's fleeting impulses. Attempts to resist the natural motivation toward facial expression are easily recognizable and immediately understood as such.

Ambivalence as Social Information

Gerben van Kleef's (2016, 27) Emotions as Social Information (ESI) model posits that insofar as emotions are characterized by action tendencies, emotional expressions are signals of social predispositions (see also Haidt & Keltner 1999; Huebner & Glazer 2016). A pout signals that I may withdraw from social interaction. A frown indicates that I aim to compete with you. A sneer indicates that I may attempt to exclude you. We read the expressions of the face to anticipate each other's actions and to plan our own actions accordingly.

How does suppression fit within ESI? van Kleef (2016, 34-35) tends to treat suppression as the attempt to withhold pertinent social information—to keep others from knowing one’s emotions. As such, van Kleef tends to view suppression as a failure of cooperation. I’ve suggested an alternative way of thinking about suppression. Rather than thinking of it as an attempt to withhold pertinent social information, we should think of suppression itself as a source of pertinent social information. If you can see that I am suppressing my emotions, then you know two things about me. You know that I am ambivalent about expressing my emotion, and you know that I have resolved this ambivalence by adhering to the norm against expression. This tells you a great deal about my motivations (see Rothman et al. 2017).

It is useful to see how a person handles their *embivalence* (ambivalence about emotional expression), because this tells you something about how that person will handle their *normbivalence* (ambivalence about social norms). We often feel pulled between doing what we are supposed to do and doing what we want to do. Impulsive people tend to resolve their normbivalence by following their immediate feelings and desires, norms be damned. Self-controlled people tend to resolve it by following the norms, immediate feelings and desires be damned.

On my view of suppression as a signal of self-control, embivalence serves as a proxy for normbivalence. Someone who resolves embivalence by giving in to the urge to express may also resolve normbivalence by giving in to whatever urge they feel. By contrast, someone who resolves embivalence by delaying gratification may also resolve normbivalence by delaying gratification. An important aspect of cooperation is partner selection—deciding who to cooperate with and when. Sometimes, we have to make this decision on the fly. In such circumstance, the ability to estimate impulsivity and self-control at a glance would be immensely useful. Look at your potential partner’s face. If she expresses every fleeting feeling, then she may be impulsive. But if she holds those fleeting feelings in check, if she maintains her composure, then she may be self-controlled. Often, it’s easier to cooperate with the self-controlled.

Ambivalence and Alienation

At the beginning of this chapter I reviewed a variety of negative outcomes associated with embivalence—outcomes including burnout and depression. Yet studies suggest that embivalence leads to these outcomes when

suppression is experienced as *alienating* (Wood et al. 2008). When a person feels that they are constantly hiding their feelings and putting on an act that doesn't reflect their true feelings, they are more likely to suffer from ambivalence. By contrast, when workers are given more autonomy in how they suppress their emotions, they are less likely to experience suppression as alienating, and less likely to suffer from the negative outcomes associated with ambivalence (Grandey, Fisk, & Steiner 2005).

On the view that I'm advocating, suppression isn't pretending, and so shouldn't be experienced as alienating. Rather than thinking of ambivalence as a conflict between the individual's desires and society's demands, we ought to think of it as a conflict between the individual's impulses and her long-term social goals. Suppression is not acquiescence; suppression is self-determination. Ideally, thinking of suppression in this way will mitigate the negative outcomes associated with ambivalence.

To express or not to express? The answer depends on the situation. If you want to build trust with potential cooperators, suppress your emotions to demonstrate your capacity for self-control. But if there's no need to signal self-control, go ahead and express yourself. There is little to be gained by trying to hide your feelings and much to be gained by making them known.

Bibliography

- Ahmed, S. (2010). *The promise of happiness*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Albani, C., Blaser, G., Völker, J., Geyer, M., Schmutzer, G., Bailer, H., Grulke, N., Brähler, E., Traue, H. C. (2007). Ambivalence over Emotional Expressiveness: psychometric evaluation of the AEQ-G18 in a representative German survey. *Psycho-Social Medicine* 4: Doc10.
- Bar-On, D. (2004). *Speaking My Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, C. (1844). *Essays on the anatomy and philosophy of expression*. London: John Murray.
- Briggs, J.L. (1970). *Never in anger: Portrait of an Eskimo family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brönte, C. (1847). *Wuthering Heights*. London: Thomas Cautley Newby.
- Copenhaver, R., & Odenbaugh, J. (2019). Experiencing Emotions: Aesthetics, Representationalism, and Expression. In B. Brogaard & D.E. Gatzia (Eds.), *The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Darwin, C. (1872/2009). *The expression of the emotions in man and animals*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dawel, A., Wright, L., Irons, J., Dumbleton, R., Palermo, R., O'Kearney, R., & Mckone, E. (2016). Perceived emotion genuineness: normative ratings for popular facial expression stimuli and the development of perceived-as-genuine and perceived-as-fake sets. *Behavior Research Methods* 49(4): 1539-1562.
- Ekman, P. (2016). What scientists who study emotion agree about. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 11(1): 31-34.
- Ekman, P., Friesen, W.V., O'Sullivan, M., Chan, A., Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis, I., Heider, K., Krause, R., LeCompte, W.A., Pitcairn, T., Ricci-Bitti, P.E., Scherer, K., Tomita, M., & Tzavaras, A. (1987). Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53(4): 712-717.
- Frank, R. (1988). *Passions within reason*. New York: Norton.
- Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *The Journal of Philosophy* 68(1): 5-20.
- Glazer, T. (2019). Epistemic violence and emotional misperception. *Hypatia* 34(1): 59-75.
- Gottfredson, M.R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). *A general theory of crime*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Grandey, A.A., Fisk, G.M., & Steiner, D.D. (2005). Must 'service with a smile' be stressful? The moderating role of personal control for American and French employees. *J Appl Psychol* 90(5): 893-904.
- Green, M. (2007). *Self-expression*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gross, J.J. & Barrett, L.F. (2011). Emotion generation and emotion regulation: One or two depends on your point of view. *Emotion Review* 3(1): 8-16.
- Haidt, J. (2013). *The righteous mind*. New York: Vintage.
- Haidt, J. & Keltner, D. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels. *Cognition and Emotion* 13(5): 505-521.
- Heisel, M.J. & Mongrain, M. (2004). Facial expressions and ambivalence: Looking for conflict in all the right faces. *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 28: 35.
- Hobbes, T. (1651/1994). *Leviathan*. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.
- Hochschild, A. (1983). *The managed heart*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Huebner, B. & Glazer, T. (2016). Emotional processing in individual and social recalibration. In J. Kiverstein (Ed.), *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Social Mind* (pp. 280-297). New York: Routledge.
- Hume, D. (1975). *A treatise of human nature*. L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), P.H. Nidditch (rev.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Humm, D.G. & Wadsworth, G.W. (1942). Temperament in Industry. *Personnel Journal* 21: 314-322.
- Jerg-Bretzke, L., Walter, S., Limbrecht-Ecklundt, K., & Traue, H.C. (2013). Emotional ambivalence and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in soldiers during military operations. *Psychosoc Med* 10: Doc03. doi: 10.3205/psm000093.
- Jeung, D.Y., Kim, C., & Chang, S.J. (2018). Emotional labor and burnout: A review of the literature. *Yonsei Medical Journal* 59(2): 187-193.
- Kim, H.-J. & Choo, J. (2017). Emotional labor: Links to depression and work-related musculoskeletal disorders in call center workers. *Workplace Health & Safety* 65(8): 346-354.
- King, L.A. & Emmons, R.A. (1990). Conflict over emotional expression: psychological and physical correlates. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 58(5): 864-77.
- King, L.A. (1998). Ambivalence over emotional expression and reading emotions in situations and faces. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74(3): 753-762.
- Koch, P.J. (1983). Expressing emotion. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 64: 176-191.

- Lorde, A. (1981/1997). The uses of anger. *Women's Studies Quarterly* 25(1/2): 278-285.
- Matsumoto, D. & Willingham, B. (2009.) Spontaneous facial expressions of emotion in congenitally and noncongenitally blind individuals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96(1): 1-10.
- Melville, H. (1853). *Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street*. Putnam's Magazine.
- Mills, CW (1951). *White collar: The American middle classes*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Namba, S., Kabir, R. S., Miyatani, M., & Nakao, T. (2018). Dynamic displays enhance the ability to discriminate genuine and posed facial expressions of emotion. *Frontiers in Psychology* 9: 672. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00672.
- Pickard, H. (2018). The puzzle of addiction. In H. Pickard and S. Ahmed, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction*. New York: Routledge.
- Pleck, J.H. (1995). The gender role strain paradigm: An update. In R.F. Levant & W.S. Pollack (eds.), *A New Psychology of Men* (pp. 11-32). New York: Basic Books.
- Putnam, R.D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rothman, N.B. (2011). Steering sheep: How expressed emotional ambivalence elicits dominance in interdependent decision making contexts. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 116: 66-82.
- Rothman, N.B., Pratt, M.G., Rees, L., & Vogus, T.J. (2017). Understanding the dual nature of ambivalence: Why and when ambivalence leads to good and bad outcomes. *Academy of Management Annals* 11(1): 33-72.
- Rychlowska, M., Miyamoto, Y., Matsumoto, D., Hess, U., Gilboa-Schechtman, E., Kamble, S., Muluk, H., Masuda, T., & Niedenthal, P.M. (2015). Heterogeneity of long-history migration explains cultural differences in reports of emotional expressivity and the functions of smiles. *Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences, USA* 112(19):E2429-36.
- Scarantino, A. (2014). The motivational theory of emotions. In D. Jacobson & J. D'Arms (eds.), *Moral Psychology and Human Agency* (pp. 156-185). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schmitter, A.M. (2010). Hobbes on the emotions. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD3Hobbes.html>>.

- Schopenhauer, A. (1851/2000). *Parerga and Paralipomena*. E.F.J. Payne (tr.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Shariff, A.F. & Tracy, J.L. (2011). What are emotion expressions for? *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 20(6): 395-399.
- Stearns, P.N. & Stearns, C.Z. (1985). Emotionology: Clarifying the history of emotion and emotional standards. *The American Historical Review* 90(4): 813-836.
- Stearns, C.Z., & Stearns, P.N. (1986). *Anger: The struggle for emotional control in America's history*. Chicago, IL, US: University of Chicago Press.
- Stearns, P. (1993). Boys, girls, and emotions: Redefinitions and historical change. *The Journal of American History* 80(1): 36-74.
- Stearns, P. (1994). *American cool: Constructing a twentieth-century emotional style*. New York: NYU Press.
- Sunstein, C. (1996). Social norms and social roles. *Columbia Law Review* 96: 903-968.
- Suri, G. & Gross, J.J. (2016). Emotion regulation: A valuation perspective. In L.F. Barrett, M. Lewis, & J.M. Haviland-Jones (eds.), *Handbook of emotions, 4th ed.* (pp. 453-66). New York: Guilford Press.
- Tittle, C.R., Ward, D.A., & Grasmick, H.G. (2003). Self-control and crime/deviance: Cognitive vs. behavioral measures. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 19(4): 333-365.
- Van Kleef, G.A. (2016). *The interpersonal dynamics of emotion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Vazsonyi, A.T., Mikuska, J., Kelley, E.L. (2017). It's time: A meta-analysis on the self-control-deviance link. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 48: 48-63
- Veblen, T. (1899/1994). *The theory of the leisure class: An economic study of institutions*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Webb, T.L., Miles, E., & Sheeran, P. (2012). Dealing with feeling: A meta-analysis of the effectiveness of strategies derived from the process model of emotion regulation. *Psychological Bulletin* 138(4): 775-808.
- Wolf, S. (2012). Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility. In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Ethical theory: An anthology*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Wood, A.M., Linley, P.A., Maltby, J., Baliouis, M., & Joseph, S. (2008). The authentic personality: a theoretical and empirical conceptualization and the development of the authenticity scale. *J Couns Psychol* 55: 385-399.

Zawizki, T.W. (2013). *Mindshaping*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.